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UNILATERAL  INVASIONS  OF  PRIVACY
Roger Allan Ford*
ABSTRACT
Most people seem to agree that individuals have too little privacy, and most proposals to
address that problem focus on ways to give those users more information about, and more control
over, how information about them is used.  Yet in nearly all cases, information subjects are not
the parties who make decisions about how information is collected, used, and disseminated;
instead, outsiders make unilateral decisions to collect, use, and disseminate information about
others.  These potential privacy invaders, acting without input from information subjects, are the
parties to whom proposals to protect privacy must be directed.
This Article develops a theory of unilateral invasions of privacy rooted in the incentives of
potential outside invaders.  It first briefly describes the different kinds of information flows that
can result in losses of privacy and the private costs and benefits to the participants in these
information flows.  It argues that in many cases the relevant costs and benefits are those of an
outsider deciding whether certain information flows occur.  These outside invaders are more likely
to act when their own private costs and benefits make particular information flows worthwhile,
regardless of the effects on information subjects or on social welfare.  And potential privacy
invaders are quite sensitive to changes in these costs and benefits, unlike information subjects, for
whom transaction costs can overwhelm incentives to make information more or less private.
The Article then turns to privacy regulation, arguing that this unilateral-invasion theory
sheds light on how effective privacy regulations should be designed.  Effective regulations are
those that help match the costs and benefits faced by a potential privacy invader with the costs
and benefits to society of a given information flow.  Law can help do so by raising or lowering the
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distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
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costs or benefits of a privacy invasion, but only after taking account of other costs and benefits
faced by the potential privacy invader.
INTRODUCTION
Shortly before Thanksgiving in 2011, shopping mall operator Forest City
Commercial Management announced that it would begin tracking shoppers’
movements in two of their malls, using the signals from cell phones to trace
individual paths from store to store.1  The malls would use a technology
called FootPath that, as its maker, Path Intelligence, explained, could help
an operator understand shoppers’ behavior and use this information to make
“[d]ecisions that optimize tenant performance, protect and drive lease val-
ues, maximize operating income, and ultimately, drive asset value.”2
Tracking shoppers’ movements was not a new phenomenon; malls and
other retailers have long looked to see where customers linger, what areas
they avoid, and what stores attract like-minded shoppers.3  Nor was the Foot-
Path system itself new; even before the Thanksgiving announcement, the
Path Intelligence technology was used by malls in Australia and the United
Kingdom.4  Yet Forest City’s tracking lasted just one day before the backlash
from regulators and others raising privacy concerns.5  In letters to Path Intel-
1 Annalyn Censky, Malls Track Shoppers’ Cell Phones on Black Friday, CNN (Nov. 22,
2011, 11:48 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/11/22/technology/malls_track_cell_
phones_black_friday/.
2 See ICSC Signs Global Agreement with Shopper Locations Analytics Provider Path Intelligence,
ICSC, (Mar. 23, 2015), http://www.icsc.org/press/icsc-signs-global-agreement-with-shop-
per-location-analytics-provider-path-i.  While this Article was in the publication process,
Path Intelligence ceased operations and went into administration, the United Kingdom’s
rough equivalent of bankruptcy reorganization.
3 E.g., Method and Sys. for Automatic Analysis of the Trip of People in a Retail Space
Using Multiple Cameras, U.S. Patent No. 8,098,888 (filed Jan. 28, 2008) (issued Jan. 17,
2012); Sys. and Method for Customer Behavior Movement Frequency Prediction in a
Store, U.S. Patent No. 7,778,863 (filed Sept. 13, 2005) (issued Aug. 17, 2010); Customer
Activity Monitor, U.S. Patent No. 5,250,941 (filed Aug. 9, 1991) (issued Oct. 5, 1993); Jef-
frey S. Larson et al., An Exploratory Look at Supermarket Shopping Paths, 22 INT’L J. RES. MAR-
KETING 395 (2005); Censky, supra note 1.
4 Shopping Centers Track Customers Via Cell Phone Signals, SLASHDOT (May 18, 2008, 2:56
PM), http://yro.slashdot.org/story/08/05/18/1838222/shopping-centers-%20track-cus-
tomers-via-cell-phone-signals; Kylie Collier, ‘Creepy’ Path Intelligence Retail Technology Tracks
Shoppers, NEWS.COM.AU (Oct. 14, 2011, 8:24 AM), http://www.news.com.au/finance/
money/creepy-retail-technology-tracks-shoppers/story-e6frfmci-1226166413071; Steven
Morris, Shopping Centre Tracking System Condemned by Civil Rights Campaigners, GUARDIAN
(Jan. 4, 2012, 3:19 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/jan/04/shopping-
centre-tracking-system-condemned.
5 See, e.g., Sean Gallagher, We’re Watching: Malls Track Shopper’s [sic] Cell Phone Signals
to Gather Marketing Data, ARS TECHNICA (Nov. 25, 2011, 4:15 PM), http://arstechnica.com/
business/2011/11/were-watching-malls-track-shoppers-cell-phone-signals-to-gather-market-
ing-data/ (“There’s just one problem with this type of detailed tracking: it’s technically
illegal, according to Mark Rasch, the director of cybersecurity at CSC.”); Press Release,
Senator Charles E. Schumer, Schumer Reveals: This Holiday Season, New Technology
Could be Tracking Shoppers’ Movements in Shopping Centers Through Their Cell
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ligence and to the Federal Trade Commission, Senator Charles Schumer
objected that shoppers would be tracked without their consent and could
only opt out by turning off their cell phones or avoiding shopping malls,
burdens he argued were unreasonable.6  Faced with this scrutiny, Forest City
pulled the plug on the automated tracking.7  So rather than tracking shop-
pers via cell phone, the Forest City malls will have to adopt more costly means
of tracking shoppers or forswear the benefits that FootPath promised.8
The FootPath story is typical of a recurring scenario in information-pri-
vacy law: a new practice that seems creepy and invasive, even though it results
in many of the same information flows that existed before the practice.  Pri-
vacy law has struggled with such developments.  Under the dominant legal
view, there is no privacy problem with what Forest City aimed to do.  The
system collected information about shoppers’ visible movements in a public
place—information that seems public, in some sense, and can freely be col-
lected by any number of observers.  The information did not concern shop-
pers’ sensitive, personal, or intimate lives; none of it was inherently “private,”
in that sense.  Yet shoppers, and Senator Schumer, had an immediate and
visceral reaction that the system would compromise their privacy.  It mattered
to them that information about more shoppers would be collected and used,
even if there was nothing especially sensitive about the specific information
collected.
This scenario also occurs in Fourth Amendment law.  For decades, it was
axiomatic that a criminal defendant cannot expect privacy in his or her activi-
ties in public.9  As the Court explained in United States v. Knotts, such activi-
ties are inherently and inevitably revealed to the world:
A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to
another.  When [the defendant] traveled over the public streets he volunta-
Phones; Calls For Mandatory Opt-in Before Retailers Are Allowed to Track Shoppers’
Movements (Nov. 28, 2011) [hereinafter Press Release].
6 Press Release, supra note 5.
7 Sean Gallagher, Mall Owners Pull Plug on Cellular Tracking (For Now), WIRED (Nov. 29,
2011, 11:11 AM), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2011/11/mall-pull-plug-cell-track
ing/.
8 Or they will just have to wait until technologies like FootPath’s are no longer consid-
ered novel and threatening.  Indeed, in the time since Forest City killed its plans, several
other companies have announced or begun using systems that do much the same thing.
See, e.g., Stephanie Clifford & Quentin Hardy, Attention, Shoppers: Store Is Tracking Your Cell,
N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/15/business/attention-
shopper-stores-are-tracking-your-cell.html; Brian Fung, How Stores Use Your Phone’s WiFi to
Track Your Shopping Habits, WASH. POST (Oct. 19, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/the-switch/wp/2013/10/19/how-stores-use-your-phones-wifi-to-track-your-shopping-
habits/; Declan McCullagh, Euclid Downplays Privacy Concerns About Wi-Fi Tracking, CNET
(May 16, 2012, 5:36 PM), http://news.cnet.com/%208301-1009_3-57435911-83/.
9 See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983); Hester v. United States,
265 U.S. 57, 58 (1924) (affirming conviction when “[t]he defendant’s own acts, and those
of his associates, disclosed [to the public] the jug[,] the jar and the bottle” that showed
illegal concealment of distilled spirits).
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rily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the fact that he was traveling
over particular roads in a particular direction, the fact of whatever stops he
made, and the fact of his final destination when he exited from public roads
onto private property.10
Since a defendant voluntarily revealed his movements to the world simply by
moving around in public, an officer gathering that public information did
not conduct a “search” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
Yet in 2012, the Court unanimously reversed course, concluding in
United States v. Jones that using a GPS device to monitor a defendant’s move-
ments in public is a search for which a police officer might have to obtain a
warrant.11  The Court divided on its reasoning, but five Justices recognized
that GPS monitoring presented new and unique privacy concerns even if the
devices only collected information that could otherwise be obtained by con-
ventional police techniques.  By removing obstacles to such full-time surveil-
lance, the Justices reasoned, GPS technologies made it likely that many more
defendants would be tracked, a distinction that mattered for privacy.12
Criminal defendants are hardly alone: more information is being col-
lected, used, and disseminated today than at any point in history, a trend that
shows no signs of slowing.  Several factors have contributed to this trend,
including changes in laws, social norms, and incentives.  The main driver,
however, is evolving technology, which has made it easier and cheaper for
people to collect, use, and disseminate information about others.  It’s not
inevitable that technology would have this effect; individual technology
changes can make information flows more or less common.  Yet the net
effect has been a striking increase in the amount of information collected,
used, and disseminated to others.
The dominant response to this increase in information flows has dif-
fered between the private and public sectors.  In the public sector, courts and
legislatures have used the Fourth Amendment and new statutes to limit the
ability of law-enforcement agencies to collect and use information.13  These
laws have generally worked by regulating the outsider—the entity collecting,
using, or disseminating information about someone else—rather than the
information subject.  In the private sector, however, the focus has been differ-
ent.  Most responses to privacy concerns in the private sector have aimed to
inform information subjects about how personal information is used and
control over that use.  Thus, Senator Schumer urged Path Intelligence “to
obtain the explicit consent of shoppers’ [sic] through an opt-in policy in
10 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281–82.
11 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (2012).
12 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955–57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 963–64 (Alito, J., con-
curring in the judgment).
13 See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945; Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); see also
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C); Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment
Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476 (2011).
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order to protect their privacy” before deploying the FootPath system.14  And
in numerous enforcement actions against private companies that failed to
protect consumers’ privacy, government agencies have focused on failures of
transparency and control, rather than targeting the underlying behavior.
The dominant response, then, has been to focus on the information subject
as the relevant decisionmaker, rather than on the outsider collecting, using,
or disseminating information.15
This focus on information subjects is puzzling because in many cases,
information flows happen without the consent, or even the knowledge, of
information subjects.  Instead, often an outsider like Path Intelligence is the
sole decisionmaker determining whether the information flow happens in
the first instance.  Although these regulatory responses can be thought of as
efforts to ensure information subjects also participate in the decision that an
information flow goes forward, they usually do so indirectly at best, and they
have had little effect in preventing unwanted information flows.
This Article examines the dynamic seen in the FootPath and Jones cases,
and in countless other contexts, seeking to understand why more and more
information is being collected, used, and disseminated, even as shoppers,
Supreme Court Justices, and others find this trend so troublesome.  The core
contention is that there is a category of information flows for which the party
that determines whether the information flow occurs—the decisionmaker—
is someone other than the information subject.  Such information flows,
which I call unilateral invasions, occur when the interests of the potential
invader dictate, rather than when the interests of society or the information
subject would dictate.16  This creates a basic asymmetry between the factors
that influence how much privacy any given individual has and the benefits of
that level of privacy: although privacy offers benefits both to information sub-
jects and to society as a whole, it is often individuals other than the informa-
tion subjects who determine the amount of privacy that exists.  Since these
outsiders act according to their own incentives, ignoring or discounting the
effects on information subjects and society as a whole, they systematically
underprotect privacy.  This situation has been exacerbated by evolving tech-
nologies, laws, norms, and incentives, which have increased the incentives to
invade privacy.
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part I provides background, discussing
various factors that dictate whether an information flow will happen or not.
14 Press Release, supra note 5.
15 See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent
Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1880 (2013) (labeling this dominant approach “privacy
self-management”).
16 By calling them unilateral invasions, I do not mean to suggest that the subject of the
information necessarily objects to the invader’s action; he or she may welcome it or even
want it to occur.  But the critical point is that information flows are often initiated by
outsiders, acting without the information subject’s initiative, cooperation, consent, or even
knowledge.
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Part II develops a descriptive account of privacy based on these factors.
Most privacy law and literature is focused on protecting information that is
considered secret, sensitive, or intimate as “private.”  Yet people can react as
strongly to invasions that involve no secret, sensitive, or intimate informa-
tion—indeed, that involve information that is otherwise freely available to
the public—as the FootPath and Jones cases show.  This Part first argues that
many information flows, including the ones at issue in the most serious pri-
vacy problems, happen because of unilateral decisions by outsiders, not infor-
mation subjects, and thus can be described as unilateral invasions.  It then
discusses two models to predict when unilateral invasions will occur.  Under a
rational-choice model, a unilateral invasion will occur when the outsider’s
private benefits exceed the private costs of the invasion, regardless of the
social value of the information flow.  That model, however, fails to account
for various sources of uncertainty that render the rational-choice model an
unrealistic account of privacy in the real world.  A stochastic-choice model,
like a rational-choice model, considers the private costs and benefits of infor-
mation flows, while also accounting for these uncertainties.  These descrip-
tive approaches, I argue, both better reflect people’s real-world instincts
about where information falls on a spectrum between “public” and “private,”
and are more useful in a variety of legal contexts.
Finally, Part III discusses how unilateral invasions can help provide a
framework for regulating privacy.  The goal of privacy regulation should be
to help ensure that the levels of privacy people experience in the real
world—i.e., where information falls on the spectrum from “public” to “pri-
vate”—match some normative view of ideal levels of privacy.  A key conse-
quence of the unilateral-invasion theory, then, is that regulations can work
most effectively by adjusting the private costs and benefits of the deci-
sionmaker, i.e., the potential unilateral invader, rather than trying to give
information subjects greater knowledge or control over how information
about them is collected, used, and disseminated.  If these costs and benefits
lead to too much information being made public, then law can respond by
increasing the costs, or reducing the benefits, of an invasion.  Moreover, law
can adapt dynamically to changes in these costs and benefits due to changing
technologies, norms, or incentives.  Indeed, this is exactly what the Court did
in Jones, and what Senator Schumer threatened to do in the shopping mall
case.
I. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF INFORMATION FLOWS
This Part discusses the factors that make information flows more or less
likely to occur.  At its most basic, information privacy is the study of informa-
tion flows, or the ways in which information (say, about a person) moves
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through society.17  In this Article I focus on three broad categories of infor-
mation flows: the collection, use, and dissemination of information.18
These three types of information flows share a key feature: in each type,
an outsider can increase his, her, or its knowledge about an information sub-
ject, potentially leading to a privacy problem.19  For instance, information
collection includes surveillance, online tracking, and interrogation, all activi-
ties directed to obtaining information about someone.20  Likewise, informa-
tion dissemination can include disclosure, breach of confidentiality, and
appropriation, all activities directed to providing information about someone
to others.21
Information use is the trickiest category.  While many uses of informa-
tion are benign—a magazine could not deliver issues to its subscribers with-
out knowing their names and addresses—others can have effects similar to
collection and dissemination.  An information aggregator, for instance, can
combine different sources of information about a person to infer new facts
about that person—potentially highly revealing facts, even from seemingly
innocuous information.22  Banks and credit-card companies have made
extensive use of this process, even going so far as to infer that shoppers who
17 E.g., HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT 2 (2010) (“What people care most
about is not simply restricting the flow of information but ensuring that it flows
appropriately.”).
18 See generally id. at 11, 21–64 (discussing “tracking and monitoring,” “aggregation and
analysis,” and “dissemination and publication”); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY
106–61 (2008) (discussing “information collection,” “information processing,” and “infor-
mation dissemination”); Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject
as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1373, 1417 (2000) (discussing the “collection, use, and
exchange” and the “collection, processing, and exchange” of information).  Note that I am
not focusing on other issues, like sexual privacy, harassment, freedom of association, or
nuisances, that are sometimes thought of as questions of privacy, but that do not involve
information. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–56 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 483–86 (1965); N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462
(1958); SOLOVE, supra, at 161–70; Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J.
421 (1980); cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (focusing on whether the petition-
ers had a liberty interest, rather than a privacy interest, in private sexual activities).
19 By “outsider,” I mean any participant in the information flow other than the infor-
mation subject, that is, the person to whom the information relates.  So, for instance, when
police arrest a suspect and process him or her by taking a mug shot and fingerprints, the
arrestee is the information subject, and potential outsiders include the police who collect
the mug shot and fingerprints, the lab tech who compares the fingerprints to prints col-
lected at a crime scene and uploads the fingerprints to a fingerprint database, the witness
who reviews the mug shot as part of a photo line up, and the investigators in other cases
who make later use of the mug shot and fingerprints.  Sometimes the outsider will be a
party to an information flow, such as when a patient discusses his or her feelings with a
therapist; sometimes the outsider will be a third party to the information flow, such as
when the government intercepts an email between an information subject and someone
else.
20 See NISSENBAUM, supra note 17, at 21–35; SOLOVE, supra note 18, at 106–17.
21 See NISSENBAUM, supra note 17, at 51–64; SOLOVE, supra note 18, at 136–61.
22 See SOLOVE, supra note 18, at 117–21.
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put certain purchases on their credit cards, like generic car oil or marriage
counseling, are larger credit risks than those who buy premium brands or
home-improvement tools.23  Personal identification, such as when police
identify a suspect from DNA, is another example, since linking particular
pieces of information to specific individuals can have a similar effect to infor-
mation collection or dissemination.  And this process can take seemingly
innocuous information and use it to infer strikingly sensitive information.
Device fingerprinting, for example, takes minor technical details from a
device—say, a web browser’s user-agent string, plugins, and time zone, or a
camera’s dead pixels and lens scratches—to uniquely identify a user; this can
link up seemingly unrelated activity, like someone’s shopping history and
their porn habits.24  This kind of inference can make it difficult or impossi-
ble for people to act anonymously or pseudonymously, which can make it
hard to experiment and progress in self-development.25
In addition to classifying information flows as involving the collection,
use, or dissemination of information, we can also focus on the participants
involved in the information flow.  For any information flow involving infor-
mation about a person, there will necessarily be an information subject.  In
most cases there will also be others collecting, using, disseminating, or receiv-
ing the information, or otherwise facilitating the information flow.26  For
information collection, the relevant outsider is usually the collector; exam-
ples include a police officer following a suspect and an advertising company
23 See Charles Duhigg, What Does Your Credit-Card Company Know About You?, N.Y. TIMES
MAG. (May 12, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/17/magazine/17credit-t.html;
Stacey Vanek Smith, Credit Card Companies Are Watching You, MARKETPLACE (July 8, 2009,
4:28 PM), http://www.marketplace.org/topics/business/borrowers/credit-card-compa-
nies-are-watching-you.
24 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 8,965,041 (filed July 16, 2014) (issued Feb. 24, 2015)
(describing and claiming, in a patent assigned to Facebook, a system to determine unique
camera signatures and associate individual cameras with users); U.S. Patent No. 8,818,022
(filed June 13, 2013) (issued Aug. 26, 2014) (same); Panopticlick: How Unique—and Tracka-
ble—Is Your Browser?, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://panopticlick.eff.org/ (last visited Jan.
27, 2016).
25 See SOLOVE, supra note 18, at 121–25.
26 See, e.g., NISSENBAUM, supra note 17, at 140–47 (discussing norms governing the flow
of information from a sender to a recipient).  In rare circumstances, the information sub-
ject may be the only relevant party.  A good example is the case of personal analytics, when
someone tracks data about his or her own life. E.g., Kashmir Hill, Adventures in Self-Surveil-
lance: Fitbit, Tracking My Movement and Sleep, FORBES (Feb. 25, 2011, 12:07 PM), http://www
.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2011/02/25/adventures-in-self-surveillance-fitbit-tracking-
my-movement-and-sleep/ (describing the Fitbit, a small device that attaches to clothing
and tracks the wearer’s movements and activity throughout the day); Stephen Wolfram,
The Personal Analytics of My Life, STEPHEN WOLFRAM BLOG (Mar. 8, 2012), http://blog.steph
enwolfram.com/2012/03/the-personal-analytics-of-my-life/ (reporting data from more
than two decades of self tracking); see also QUANTIFIED SELF, http://quantifiedself.com/
(last visited Dec. 1, 2015) (blog devoted to “self knowledge through numbers”).  For the
most part, we can set these cases aside, both because they seem relatively rare and because
they do not present the same privacy difficulties as other kinds of information flows.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-3\NDL305.txt unknown Seq: 9 30-MAR-16 12:48
2016] unilateral  invasions  of  privacy 1083
using cookies to track a user’s web-browsing behavior.  For information dis-
semination, outsiders can include the party disseminating the information
and any parties receiving the information.  Examples of dissemination
include a magazine publishing information about a celebrity and a database
company making available public records about a taxpayer.  And when infor-
mation about a subject is used, the relevant outsider is typically the user.
Uses of information take many forms, but the common feature is that the
outsider takes information about others and processes it in a way that allows
it to make inferences about, or affect the interests of, the information sub-
jects.  Well-known examples include financial institutions that process infor-
mation to make credit decisions and political campaigns that target likely
voters based on information in consumer databases.27  But not all uses
involve large databases of personal information; Joe Klein was famously
unmasked as the anonymous author of the novel Primary Colors based on
handwriting analysis and comparisons between the novel and his other writ-
ings.28  Such targeted uses of information can likewise present privacy
problems.  Regardless, all of these information flows affect their various par-
ticipants—the information subjects; outside collectors, disseminators, or
users; and any outside recipients—in various ways, and those effects will, in
many cases, determine whether or not the information flow occurs.
These effects are also dynamic: there is widespread recognition that
evolving technology has made certain kinds of information flows more com-
mon, or even possible for the first time.  The instances of location tracking
recounted in the introduction provide one example, but others are common.
Widespread access to public and commercial databases has made re-identifi-
cation of “anonymized” records possible;29 facial-recognition software has
27 See SASHA ISSENBERG, THE VICTORY LAB (2012); Colin Delany, The Nuts and Bolts of
Obama’s Data-Driven Campaign, CAMPAIGNS & ELECTIONS, Jan.–Feb. 2013, at 16–17; Craig
Timberg & Amy Gardner, Democrats Push to Redeploy Obama’s Voter Database, WASH. POST
(Nov. 20, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/democrats-push-to-
redeploy-obamas-voter-database/2012/11/20/d14793a4-2e83-11e2-89d4-
040c9330702a_story.html; supra note 23 and accompanying text.
28 E.g., Doreen Carvajal, Columnist’s Mea Culpa: I’m Anonymous, N.Y. TIMES (July 18,
1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/07/18/us/columnist-s-mea-culpa-i-m-anonymous
.html.
29 See Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2010); Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII
Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1814, 1841–45 (2011); Felix T. Wu, Defining Privacy and Utility in Data Sets, 84 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1117 (2013); Jane Yakowitz, Tragedy of the Data Commons, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1
(2011).  There is also a substantial computer-science literature on identification of individ-
uals using purportedly anonymous data. See, e.g., Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye et al., Unique
in the Shopping Mall: On the Reidentifiability of Credit Card Metadata, 347 SCIENCE 536 (2015);
Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, Robust De-anonymization of Large Sparse Datasets, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2008 IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY 111–125 (2008);
Latanya Sweeney, k-Anonymity: A Model For Protecting Privacy, 10 INT’L J. ON UNCERTAINTY,
FUZZINESS & KNOWLEDGE-BASED SYS. 557 (2002); Latanya Sweeney, Simple Demographics Often
Identify People Uniquely (Carnegie Mellon, Data Privacy Working Paper No. 3, 2000); see also
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made it possible to find criminals hiding in crowds;30 increased computa-
tional power has made it possible to decode encrypted communications;31
and even information flows as simple as text messaging and instant messag-
ing did not exist until technology made them possible.
Technology has made these information flows more common because it
has lowered their cost or increased their benefits, and thus made it easier for
decisionmakers to undertake the information flows.  Yet technology is not
the only source of changed costs; numerous other factors affect deci-
sionmakers’ relative costs and benefits.  And the examples recounted in the
introduction show the importance of this analysis.  In the shopping mall case,
the malls took a form of analysis retailers have long performed—tracking
shoppers’ footpaths—and automated it.  This meant they could collect the
exact same information—with presumably the same value—at a substantially
lower cost.  Since costs were lower, but benefits were presumably unaffected,
it was suddenly worthwhile to perform this sort of analysis on a wider scale.
The same was true in the case of GPS surveillance.  The radio transmitters at
issue in Knotts could only be picked up within a limited range, so police still
had to follow the target car around the clock, limiting the surveillance to a
few days.32  The GPS device in Jones, however, recorded its own movements
for a month; all the police had to do was place it on the suspect’s car and
retrieve it a month later.33  And even that may no longer be required: police
have gained access to built-in GPS units included in some modern cars,34 and
Ohm, supra, at 1705 nn.4 & 5 (citing sources); Schwartz & Solove, supra, at 1842–43
nn.147–56 (same).
30 E.g., Vickie Chachere, Biometrics Used to Detect Criminals at Super Bowl, ABC NEWS
(Feb. 13, 2001), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/story?id=98871.
31 E.g., Christopher Soghoian, The Spies We Trust: Third Party Service Providers and
Law Enforcement Surveillance 16 (Aug. 2012) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Indiana Univer-
sity), http://files.dubfire.net/?csoghoian-dissertation-final-8-1-2012.pdf (noting that
between 2000 and 2011, encryption was encountered in the course of executing 109 state
and federal wiretaps, but that in none of those cases did the encryption prevent officials
from obtaining the contents of communications).
32 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963–64, 964 n.10 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring
in the judgment); see also United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277–80 (1983).
33 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.
34 Many cars come equipped with the OnStar system, which essentially embeds a cell
phone in the car dashboard, or a similar system like those offered by BMW and Mercedes
Benz.  The OnStar service uses the phone to provide emergency response, hands-free call-
ing, directions, and similar services.  Because it is essentially a cell phone, the OnStar sys-
tem includes both a GPS device and a microphone.  Law-enforcement agencies have found
both features attractive. See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 440 F.3d 363, 366 (6th Cir. 2006)
(DEA agents used OnStar system’s GPS capability to track down suspect’s Cadillac Esca-
lade); In re United States, 349 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003) (FBI sought order requiring oper-
ator of unnamed OnStar-like system to activate system microphone so they could listen to
conversations in suspect’s car); United States v. Dantzler, No. 10-0024, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 68753 (W.D. La. June 16, 2010) (magistrate judge’s similar report and recommen-
dation); Sherrod v. United States, No. 08-CV-2013, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102727, at 6–7
(C.D. Ill. Dec. 19, 2008) (similar); United States v. Coleman, No. 07-20357, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12276 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 20, 2008) (similar).
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have bypassed cars entirely by tracking suspects’ cell phones35 and license
plates.36  Cell phone tracking in particular has become a routine tool for law
enforcement; wireless carriers in the United States receive hundreds of
thousands or millions of requests each year for subscriber records, including
location information.37
Two caveats should be flagged at the outset.  First, in referring to costs
and benefits, I mean the private costs and benefits to the participants in the
information flow, not the social costs and benefits of protecting privacy or
privacy generally.  Since the participants in an information flow can usually
decide whether the information flow will occur or not, and will usually take
their own interests into account, these are the costs and benefits that deter-
mine behavior.38  And second, this cost-benefit analysis cannot tell us every-
thing about the likelihood that an information flow will occur; people do not
always act rationally, and many actors will have incomplete information about
the costs and benefits of an information flow.  But there are reasons to think
that an incentive analysis can do a decent job, at least in some circumstances.
Many of the most important privacy questions today involve the collection,
use, and dissemination of information by companies, the government, and
other large institutions.  Although these institutions do not always act ration-
35 See, e.g., United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 781 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that
the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the location of his cell phone,
and thus that police did not violate the Fourth Amendment in tracking its location).
36 See, e.g., Veronica Gonzalez, Police License Plate Readers Come Under Fire, VIRGINIAN-
PILOT (Hampton Roads, Va.) (Aug. 3, 2012), http://hamptonroads.com/2012/08/police-
license-plate-readers-come-under-fire; Christine Vendel, KC Police Hold a Treasure Trove of
License Plate Data, KAN. CITY STAR (Mo.) (July 30, 2012), http://www.kansascity.com/news/
local/article306332/KC-police-hold-a-treasure-trove-of-license-plate-data.html.
37 Soghoian, supra note 31, at 24; see also Eric Lichtblau, Police Are Using Phone Tracking
as a Routine Tool, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/01/us/
police-tracking-of-cellphones-raises-privacy-fears.html; Declan McCullagh, Feds Push for
Tracking Cell Phones, CNET (Feb. 11, 2010, 4:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-
10451518-38.html.  As Soghoian points out, the ability of third-party service providers to
automatically record and provide access to subscriber records has been a critical factor
reducing the cost of performing surveillance for law enforcement.  Soghoian, supra note
31, at 32–36.  In response to the Times story, Representative Edward Markey wrote to nine
wireless carriers seeking information about how often they release subscriber information
to law-enforcement agencies.  Responses revealed how commonly used a tool cell-phone
tracking has become.  For instance, Sprint reported that in five years, it had received
approximately 52,000 court orders for wiretaps, 78,000 court orders for installation of a
pen register or trap-and-trace device, 196,000 court orders for location information, and
500,000 subpoenas from law enforcement.  Letter from Vonya B. McCann, Senior Vice
President, Sprint Nextel, to Rep. Edward J. Markey 4 (May 23, 2012), web.archive.org/
web/20130415200646/http://markey.house.gov/sites/markey.house.gov/files/docu-
ments/Sprint%20Response%20to%20Rep.%20Markey.pdf.  Likewise, Verizon Wireless
reported that in 2012, it received 270,000 requests from law-enforcement agencies for cus-
tomer information, about half of which were subpoenas.  Letter from William B. Petersen,
Gen. Counsel, Verizon Wireless, to Rep. Edward J. Markey 1–2 (Oct. 3, 2013).
38 This point is developed in Section II.A.
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ally, they do seem more likely than many individuals to calculate and respond
to their own incentives.
A. Benefits
Information subjects and others obtain many different kinds of benefits
from information flows.  Although we can broadly classify these benefits as
business or personal in character, each category contains numerous benefits
of different kinds.
Some benefits relate to the business interests of a participant.  These
business benefits come in different forms.  In some cases, the information
collected, used, or disseminated is itself valuable to the participant’s business,
such as when a private investigator collects information about a target or
when a magazine publisher disseminates information about a celebrity or
politician.  In other cases, information flows allow businesses to understand
their markets and adjust business practices accordingly.  Apple, for instance,
uses its Genius Bars to learn more about what goes wrong with its products as
customers use them, so it can gradually improve its products.39  Similarly,
Best Buy analyzed data about customer transactions to develop profiles of
different types of customers and to train its employees to concentrate on the
most profitable ones.40  In other cases, more information allows businesses to
make better predictions about future events, as when financial institutions
use credit reports to predict customer risk or when stores use customer-sur-
vey data to predict future demand.  It is impossible to classify all the ways
participants obtain business benefits from information flows, which will be as
varied as the many different kinds of businesses that engage in information
flows, but these examples show a few of the possibilities.41
Other benefits of information flows are personal in nature, and just as
business benefits correspond to a wide variety of business practices, personal
benefits from information flows can correspond to innumerable parts of peo-
ple’s lives.  Information flows are essential for people to form associations
with one another.  For instance, people will necessarily learn about each
other in the course of forming and maintaining a friendship, business part-
nership, or romantic relationship, and those information flows will help
maintain and develop the relationship over time.  Information flows are also
39 E.g., James Duncan Davidson, A Hidden Genius at the Apple Store, JD2 WEBLOG (Oct.
26, 2010), http://web.archive.org/web/20121221084345/http://duncandavidson.com/
blog/2010/10/apple-store.  The web travel site Kayak.com takes a similar approach to
improving its website: customer-service calls are answered by company engineers instead of
dedicated support personnel, so they have an immediate incentive to make the site better
and reduce the number of support calls. See Liz Welch, The Way I Work: Paul English of
Kayak, INC. (Feb. 1 2010), http://www.inc.com/magazine/20100201/the-way-i-work-paul-
english-of-kayak.html.
40 See Gary McWilliams, Analyzing Customers, Best Buy Decides Not All Are Welcome, WALL
ST. J. (Nov. 8, 2004, 11:59 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB109986994931767086.
41 Cf. Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 394–97 (1978)
(reviewing the “demand for private information”).
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essential for learning about the world; a student cannot learn history, for
instance, without absorbing information about others that has been collected
and disseminated by various outsiders.  And people gain intangible psycho-
logical benefits from information flows, such as the emotional satisfaction
from fulfilling a simple curiosity.  As before, this is far from a comprehensive
account of personal benefits from information flows, but it shows the broad
scope and diverse nature of such benefits.42
Many of the business and personal benefits from information flows are
symmetrical, or at least similar, between information subjects and outsiders,
but others are notably different.  Two people forming a friendship, business
partnership, or romantic relationship, for example, will benefit mutually
from exchanging information as they build the trust, intimacy, and a com-
mon base of knowledge that will inform their relationship going forward.
Likewise, a credit-seeking consumer who provides information to a bank
reduces the information asymmetry between herself and the bank, allowing
the bank to better assess her risk and potentially leading to a credit transac-
tion desired by both sides.  But sometimes different participants will obtain
different kinds of benefits from an information flow.  A psychiatrist asking
about a patient’s life to help diagnose or treat psychiatric problems, for
instance, benefits from information that helps her provide professional ser-
vices, while the patient obtains decidedly personal benefits from the same
information flow.  A reader of a gossip magazine obtains entertainment value
from reading about a celebrity romance, while the magazine gains advertis-
ing and sales revenue, and the celebrities add to their fame and future
bankability.  And sometimes, only some participants will benefit from the
information flow, such as when police surveil a suspect, when a bank uses a
credit report to reject a credit applicant, or when a magazine publishes infor-
mation the subject would prefer not be published.  In each of these informa-
tion flows, another participant or participants may not know about the
information flow, or may actually be harmed by it.
B. Costs
The costs of information flows are more easily classified than the bene-
fits.  At the broadest level, participants face both direct costs of implementing
the information flow itself and consequential costs that arise due to the infor-
mation flow.  A police department following a suspect, for instance, will incur
direct costs carrying out the surveillance: the value of the officers’ time; the
opportunity cost from foregoing other investigations; maybe incidental
expenses like the cost of gas (if traveling by car) or transit fare (if traveling by
42 There are also benefits that flow (no pun intended) to non-participants in the infor-
mation flow.  For instance, some information flows provide broad public benefits, like the
public-safety benefits from police and prosecutors using information to prevent, investi-
gate, and prosecute crimes.  These benefits are less relevant to our cost-benefit analysis,
since they have only a secondary effect, if any, on a decisionmaker’s calculation of whether
to cause the information flow to occur.
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bus or train).  The suspect, presumably unaware of the surveillance, faces no
such direct costs, since any expenses are just those she would have incurred
anyway, but may incur costs as a result of the surveillance, such as an
increased likelihood of criminal prosecution and conviction.
These costs can also be classified by their source, as costs from technol-
ogy, costs from social norms or society, and costs from law.  Any of these
things can make a given information flow more or less costly for different
participants:
1. Costs from Technology
Technology is often recognized as raising privacy problems by making
certain types of information flows easier.  Yet technology can make informa-
tion flows either more or less costly for the participants.
We’ve already seen a few examples of technology making information
flows less costly, as in the shopping mall and GPS examples: technology made
it far easier to track shoppers and suspects by replacing time-consuming per-
sonal observation or error-prone surveys with automatic electronic tracking.
Other examples are legion43: security cameras reduce the cost of monitoring
an area; the federal courts’ PACER system (Public Access to Court Electronic
Records) reduces the cost of obtaining information stored in court records;44
data analytics software reduces the cost of drawing inferences from consumer
behavior.  Nor is this a new phenomenon; as long ago as 1890, Warren and
Brandeis complained that “the latest advances in photographic art have ren-
dered it possible to take pictures surreptitiously,” rather than requiring a sub-
ject to pose for an extended time.45
While somewhat less common, technology can also make information
flows more costly for participants.  For instance, technology can make defen-
sive self-help easier, or even possible, helping information subjects protect
themselves from unwanted information flows.  Encryption technologies are
the classic example, but tinted windows, noise machines, disguises, radio-fre-
quency jammers, steganography, throw-away email addresses, radar detec-
tors, and cookie blockers are all technologies that raise the cost of collecting,
using, and disseminating information about someone.46  Technology can
43 Helen Nissenbaum devotes three chapters of Privacy in Context to the myriad ways
information technologies have threatened privacy, usually by reducing the cost of informa-
tion flows, though she does not put it in those terms. NISSENBAUM, supra note 17, at 19–64.
44 See generally Amanda Conley et al., Sustaining Privacy and Open Justice in the Transition
to Online Court Records: A Multidisciplinary Inquiry, 71 MD. L. REV. 772, 816 (2012).
45 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
211 (1890).
46 The TrackMeNot web-browser plugin is another good example.  TrackMeNot is
designed to make it harder for search engines and ad networks to make accurate infer-
ences about a user.  TrackMeNot works in the background, making hundreds of irrelevant
requests to search engines like Google and Bing.  Since a user’s genuine searches cannot
easily be separated from the sea of irrelevant searches, search engines and advertisers that
use search information cannot draw useful conclusions about a user’s interests and prefer-
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also cause more information to be created and stored, raising the cost of
reviewing and analyzing information.  The rise of computers has made inves-
tigating financial crimes more costly than before, for instance, because inves-
tigators may have to painstakingly review hundreds of thousands or millions
of files, and countless emails, to piece together relevant evidence.  And
advances in one technology can make other technologies less effective at
facilitating information flows.  For instance, the switch from circuit-switched
telephone networks to packet-switched networks and the substitution of cell
phones for landlines made it harder to wiretap phone calls.  Likewise, some
technology companies have taken steps to make it harder to access informa-
tion that is stored in or travels through their products, to the deep annoy-
ance of law-enforcement officials.47
2. Costs from Social Norms or Society
Other costs of information flows stem from social consequences of infor-
mation flows, determined by norms and other social structures.  As with
changes in technology, evolving norms can increase or reduce these costs.
For an information subject, these costs largely take the form of reputa-
tional harm and other negative inferences people draw from information.48
If a journalist, or an errant Google search, reveals something embarrassing
about someone—say, that the subject was arrested for drug possession, had
an affair, or embezzled from a former employer—that information could
obviously harm the subject.  He or she might have a hard time finding a job
or maintaining a marriage; friends or business contacts may drift away.  The
magnitude of this harm depends on the norms about the particular piece of
information revealed, which often vary greatly over time, in both directions.
ences. See Daniel C. Howe & Helen Nissenbaum, TrackMeNot: Resisting Surveillance in Web
Search, in LESSONS FROM THE IDENTITY TRAIL: ANONYMITY, PRIVACY AND IDENTITY IN A
NETWORKED SOCIETY 417, 420–25 (Ian Kerr et al. eds., 2009); TRACKMENOT, http://cs.nyu
.edu/trackmenot/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2016).
47 See, e.g., Andrea Peterson & Ellen Nakashima, Obama Administration Explored Ways to
Bypass Smartphone Encryption, WASH. POST (Sept. 24, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/world/national-security/obama-administration-ponders-how-to-seek-access-to-
encrypted-data/2015/09/23/107a811c-5b22-11e5-b38e-06883aacba64_story.html; Craig
Timberg, Apple Will No Longer Unlock Most iPhones, iPads for Police, Even with Search Warrants,
WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/
2014/09/17/2612af58-3ed2-11e4-b03f-de718edeb92f_story.html; Craig Timberg & Greg
Miller, FBI Blasts Apple, Google for Locking Police Out of Phones, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/2014/09/25/68c4e08e-4344-11e4-
9a15-137aa0153527_story.html; Cyrus R. Vance Jr. et al., Opinion, When Phone Encryption
Blocks Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/12/opinion/
apple-google-when-phone-encryption-blocks-justice.html.
48 On reputational harm, see ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 52–58,
232–33 (1991), DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRI-
VACY ON THE INTERNET (2007), LIOR JACOB STRAHILEVITZ, INFORMATION AND EXCLUSION
127–33 (2011), and Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous
Personal Information, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1667, 1670–1710 (2008).
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An admission of past marijuana use, for instance, sunk Douglas Ginsburg’s
nomination to the Supreme Court in 1987.49  Later admissions of drug use,
however, had far smaller effects, creating minor controversies for Clarence
Thomas,50 Bill Clinton,51 and Barack Obama.52  Similarly, information that
someone is gay is less damaging today than it was ten, twenty, or fifty years
ago.  Information about someone’s racist beliefs, in contrast, would likely be
more damaging today than it would have been decades ago.53  And these
social dynamics extend far beyond core beliefs like attitudes about civil
rights; changes in norms and reputation extend to areas as specific as atti-
tudes about how far kids should roam from home unsupervised, a surpris-
ingly controversial subject.54
The social costs to outsider participants of information flows are likewise
reputational, but they arise in a different way.  Information flows tell us some-
thing about outsiders not because we can draw inferences from the content
of the information, but because we can draw inferences from the existence of
the information flow in the first place.  The fact that someone cares enough
about someone else to collect, use, or disseminate information about that
person may be benign, but it can also seem curious, odd, or creepy.  No one
blinks an eye when a dating website asks someone about his or her romantic
preferences, collecting information about a user, but it would be strange if
Amazon, or the DMV, started asking shoppers or applicants for driver’s
licenses if they prefer blondes or brunettes.  Seeking such information would
likely impose a social cost on Amazon and the DMV: some fraction of shop-
pers would see Amazon as creepy and take their shopping elsewhere, while
some applicants would complain, put political pressure on DMV manage-
ment, or file lawsuits.  As Helen Nissenbaum has explained, these norms of
information flows will vary greatly from context to context, based on the fea-
49 Susan M. Olson, Ginsburg, Douglas Howard, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 392 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 2d. ed. 2005).
50 E.g., Stephen Labaton, Thomas Smoked Marijuana but Retains Bush Support, N.Y. TIMES
(July 11, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/07/11/us/thomas-smoked-marijuana-but-
retains-bush-support.html.
51 E.g., Clinton Tried Marijuana as a Student, He Says, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 1992),
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/30/news/30iht-bill_1.html.
52 E.g., Katharine Q. Seelye, Barack Obama, Asked About Drug History, Admits He Inhaled,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/24/world/americas/24iht-
dems.3272493.html; see also BARACK OBAMA, DREAMS FROM MY FATHER 93 (Crown 2004)
(1995).
53 As recently as 1968, George Wallace won five states and forty-six electoral votes,
running for president on an openly segregationist platform—a result that would be
unimaginable today.
54 For instance, parents have been arrested for letting kids walk to nearby destinations
unsupervised. See, e.g., Lenore Skenazy, Outrage of the Week: Mom Arrested for Letting Her Kids,
11 & 7, Walk to Pizza Shop, FREE-RANGE KIDS (July 17, 2012), http://www.freerangekids
.com/outrage-of-the-week-mom-arrested-for-letting-her-kids-11-7-walk-to-pizza-shop-2/; see
also LENORE SKENAZY, FREE-RANGE KIDS (2009).
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tures of a context, the actors involved in the context, the attributes of the
information, and various transmission principles.55
As with reputational costs to information subjects, these reputational
costs to outsiders are not static, but change over time.  Many of these norms
have become more permissive as information flows become more common.
More and more companies collect personal information and use it to target
advertising, for instance, while consumers arguably care less and less.
Google’s Gmail service, for instance, was somewhat controversial at its
launch, since it scans the contents of messages to serve ads based on the
contents of email messages, but in the years since, complaints have largely
died down.56 Likewise, location tracking of the kind that Path Intelligence
markets to shopping mall operators has become less controversial.57  But
other norms have become less permissive, or more protective of privacy, so
that the social cost of engaging in an information flow increases.  Voting, for
instance, was typically conducted out in the open until the secret ballot
became standard in the 1880s and 1890s.58  Grades and other educational
records were often publicly posted, or otherwise not considered especially
sensitive, before the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974.59
And before 2007, filings in federal court often contained sensitive informa-
tion, such as Social Security numbers, the names of minors, dates of birth,
and financial account numbers; now, such information is routinely
55 See, e.g., NISSENBAUM, supra note 17, at 129–57.
56 See, e.g., Gmail Privacy FAQ, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., http://epic.org/privacy/
gmail/faq.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2016) (arguing that “Gmail violates the privacy rights
of non-subscribers” because their emails may be monitored and saved without consent);
Saul Hansell, The Internet Ad You Are About to See Has Already Read Your E-Mail, N.Y. TIMES.
(June 21, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/21/business/media-business-advertis-
ing-internet-ad-you-are-about-see-has-already-read-your-e.html; Mark Rasch, Google’s Gmail:
Spook Heaven?, REGISTER (June 15, 2004, 9:46 AM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/
06/15/gmail_spook_heaven/ (arguing that Gmail “represents a disturbing conceptual par-
adigm—the idea that computer analysis of communications is not a search”).
57 See supra text accompanying note 8.  Though there are signs that people still distrust
location tracking, at least when put in the government’s hands.  For instance, in late 2012,
the Transportation Security Administration tested a system that estimated wait times at
airport security checkpoints by using Bluetooth to detect how long individual cell phones
were located near the checkpoint.  The agency abandoned the program after testing it in
two airports. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR AUTO-
MATED WAIT TIME (AWT) TECHNOLOGY (2012), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/privacy/privacy_pia_tsa_awt_august2012.pdf; Scott MacFarlane, Records Show
TSA Tracked Bluetooths to Observe Wait Times, WSBTV.COM (Mar. 20, 2013, 5:04 PM), http://
www.wsbtv.com/news/news/local/documents-show-tsa-tracked-bluetooth-devices-monit/
nWyb3/.
58 See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Elections and Change Under Voting with Dollars, 91 CALIF.
L. REV. 705, 708–10 (2003).
59 Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012).
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redacted.60  Each of these examples involves law requiring the change, but
such laws are typically a reaction to changing norms.61
3. Costs from Law
Finally, law itself can change the cost of an information flow, both for
information subjects and for the other participants in the information flow.
The law has several mechanisms to do this.  Most directly, it can reward or
punish information flows—so-called carrot and stick strategies—by imposing
costs or benefits (i.e., negative costs) on the parties engaging in an informa-
tion flow.  Numerous privacy laws work this way.  Laws forbidding informa-
tion disclosures, for example, impose costs on parties that nevertheless
disclose information.62  Laws permitting the collection and use of informa-
tion, but imposing restrictions or regulations, often impose significant com-
pliance costs.  Laws encouraging cooperation between private entities and
government agencies, on the other hand, reward information flows, at least
when they benefit the government.63
The law can also use what Lior Strahilevitz has called curtain and search-
light strategies.  Curtain strategies make information obscure so that it is
harder for private actors to use the information.64  Rather than imposing
direct costs like compliance costs on private actors, they make it harder to
obtain or use information.  Searchlight strategies do the opposite: they shine
light on information, making it more accessible and easier to obtain and
60 See FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2 (requiring parties to redact such sensitive information in
filings in federal district courts).
61 The secret ballot might be an exception to this rule, with secrecy rules possibly
enacted to help entrench the power of the existing political parties. See Karlan, supra note
58, at 708–10.
62 Educational institutions that violate the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act,
for instance, can lose federal funding. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.67 (2014).  The Department of
Health and Human Services has taken numerous enforcement actions against medical
providers that violated privacy provisions of the Health Insurance Portability and Account-
ability Act. See, e.g., Health Information Privacy: Case Examples and Resolution Agreements, U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement/
examples/index.html (linking to press releases covering numerous HIPAA settlements)
(last visited Jan. 27, 2016).
63 Federal law, for instance, immunizes telecommunications providers from liability
for sharing information with the federal government for certain intelligence purposes.
FISA Amendments Act of 2008 § 802, 50 U.S.C. § 1885a (2012).  Likewise, interception
orders issued pursuant to the Electronic Communications Privacy Act give telecommunica-
tions service providers an incentive to share information with law-enforcement agencies by
removing a potential cost for those that do, and imposing costs on those that refuse. See 18
U.S.C. § 2518(4) (2012) (“Any provider of wire or electronic communication service, land-
lord, custodian or other person furnishing such facilities or technical assistance shall be
compensated therefor by the applicant for reasonable expenses incurred in providing such
facilities or assistance.”); id. § 2518(12) (providing that service providers may move to
quash an interception order, but leaving the cost of so moving to service providers).
64 STRAHILEVITZ, INFORMATION AND EXCLUSION, supra note 48, at 157–58.
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use.65  Much information disclosure by the government falls into this cate-
gory, from the publication of securities filings and criminal records to the
mandated placement of hygiene ratings at the entrances to restaurants in
New York, Los Angeles, and Beijing.66  Likewise, many laws mandate disclo-
sure, in an effort to counter irrational behavior or cure information asymme-
tries, making it easier for recipients to use that information in making their
own decisions.67  And when information is disclosed, laws can make that
information easier or harder to use, for instance by requiring electronic fil-
ing or making the information available in a standardized form with API
access.68
* * *
All of these costs and benefits can come into play when information
flows occur.  Predicting what information flows will occur, though, requires
more than just adding up costs and benefits; the structure of information
flows means that some costs and benefits matter more than others.  The next
Part discusses how to use the costs and benefits of information flows to pre-
dict which information flows will occur.
II. A PROBABILISTIC ACCOUNT OF PRIVACY
Privacy is a field dominated by normative arguments, debating what
information is sensitive, personal, or intimate enough to be considered pri-
vate, or what information should receive legal protection.  Privacy scholars
have developed fewer tools for describing how widely known a particular
piece of information is.  Yet this descriptive sense of privacy is as important,
for two reasons.  First, a descriptive account of how public or private informa-
tion is matters in several areas of the law, from the Fourth Amendment to
tort law to intellectual property and trade secrecy.  In each of those areas of
law, the fact that information becomes more available or more known to
more of the public can have legal consequences, regardless of whether the
information is in some way sensitive, personal, or intimate.  And second, evi-
dence shows that individuals care greatly about this descriptive form of pri-
vacy and the degree to which information about them is available to or
65 Id. at 158–59.
66 Id.; Evelyn Iritani, Not Much Faith in Their Food, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2007), http://
articles.latimes.com/2007/jan/23/world/fg-chifood23.
67 See generally OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO
KNOW (2014).
68 As one example, Senate campaign-finance reports are filed on paper, while House
reports are filed electronically, making it much easier to review the House reports.  Kathy
Kiely, Voting in the Dark: Senate Hides $57 Million in Campaign Contributions Behind Thicket of
Dead Trees, SUNLIGHT FOUND. BLOG (Oct. 28, 2014, 10:49 AM), https://sunlightfoundation
.com/blog/2014/10/28/voting-in-the-dark-senate-hides-57-m-in-campaign-contributions-
behind-a-thicket-of-dead-trees/.  Groups like the Sunlight Foundation help make this
information more readily available, but they cannot completely close the gap.
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known by others, even when the information is not sensitive, personal, or
intimate.
The costs and benefits described in Part I can help provide such a
descriptive account of privacy.  This Part develops that account.  First, I argue
that in many cases, an outsider, rather than the information subject, decides
whether the information flow will occur.  Because such a potential unilateral
invader acts according to his or her own incentives, it is his or her own pri-
vate costs and benefits that matter.  Second, I discuss two models of unilateral
invaders’ decisionmaking about whether an individual information flow will
occur: a traditional rational-choice model and a stochastic-choice model that
better accounts for real-world behavior in the face of uncertainty.  Finally, I
shift to the perspective of an information subject, discussing how aggregating
individual information flows can provide a model for the privacy an individ-
ual enjoys in any given type of information.
A. Unilateral Invasions
Not all costs and benefits are equal, and simply listing and comparing
the costs and benefits to the participants in an information flow does not
always tell whether the information flow will happen.  Often, the benefits will
outweigh the costs for one participant in an information flow, while the costs
will outweigh the benefits for another participant.  Ideally, we might want
such an information flow to occur if the total benefits will exceed the total
costs, but the mechanics of the participants’ decisionmaking does not always
lead to that outcome.
Instead, in many information flows, a single participant who is not the
information subject makes a unilateral decision that the information flow will
occur.  This person, the relevant decisionmaker, acts (at least, within this sim-
plified model) according to his or her own incentives, so that the informa-
tion flow occurs if and only if the benefits to the decisionmaker outweigh the
costs to the decisionmaker, regardless of the effect on total welfare.  This
decisionmaker is the participant whose behavior is sensitive to changes in
incentives, such that if his or her costs or benefits of engaging in the informa-
tion flow change, the likelihood that the information flow will occur also
changes.  And, critically, I claim that for many information flows—including
the information flows at issue in the most important privacy problems—the
principal determinant of whether the information flow occurs is an outsider
rather than the information subject.
This unilateral decisionmaking can take different forms.  The clearest
example comes when the information subject is unaware of the information
flow.  For example, if a private investigator or detective is doing his or her job
right, the target of surveillance will have no idea he or she is being followed;
the investigator determines unilaterally, without the target’s input, whether
to collect information (perhaps with the input of other outsiders, such as a
client or supervisor).  Likewise, many people are unaware of the many com-
mon forms of commercial tracking, such as cookie tracking by online ad net-
works, tracking databases used by marketers and political campaigns to target
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potential customers and voters, and tracking of phones’ physical locations by
wireless carriers.69  In these cases, only one participant in the information
flow—the investigator, ad network, or database operator—is even aware of its
existence.  Since that participant gets to make a unilateral decision whether
the information flow will occur, and can give full weight to his or her own
incentives, the information flow will occur if and only if it is in his or her
interests.
Alternatively, an information subject may be aware of an information
flow, but unable to do anything about it.  One common example arises when
information about someone is published or otherwise disseminated without
the subject’s consent.  A celebrity featured in a tabloid expose´, for example,
likely knows that information about him- or herself is being disseminated to
the public, as might a subject of gossip in a close-knit community, but likely
neither can stop the information flow.  Likewise, attorneys handling defama-
tion cases or seeking to have information removed from the Internet have to
consider the Streisand effect, in which information that someone tries to
conceal becomes much more widely disseminated.70  Information can also be
collected and used with a subject’s knowledge, but without his or her con-
sent, such as when a credit bureau compiles information about a consumer
and infers his or her creditworthiness.  (This scenario also applies when an
information subject is compelled to provide information, by law or
otherwise.)
Information subjects can also be aware of a general category of informa-
tion collection, use, or dissemination, without being aware of the specifics of
any particular information flow.  Many Internet users know, for instance, that
companies track their behavior online and use it to target ads, but most users
would be surprised by the number of tracking companies and the sheer
scope of such tracking.71  And although many consumers know that retailers
track individuals’ purchases, often through loyalty cards that provide dis-
counts, they may be surprised to learn that such tracking occurs even without
loyalty cards.  Target, for instance, has no general loyalty card, but it never-
theless tracks purchases using debit and credit card numbers and personal-
ized coupons, along with information purchased from commercial databases.
Using such techniques, it has become quite good at predicting customers’
future purchasing behavior.72  Yet as one Target statistician told the New York
69 See, e.g., Chris Jay Hoofnagle et al., Behavioral Advertising: The Offer You Cannot Refuse,
6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 273, 273 (2012).
70 The effect is named for Barbara Streisand, who sued to have a photograph of her
beachfront house removed from a public database of 12,000 coastline photos.  Before the
lawsuit, the photo of Streisand’s house had been downloaded six times, including twice by
Steisand’s attorneys.  After Streisand filed the lawsuit, the photo was seen by hundreds of
thousands of people. See, e.g., Jonathan Zittrain, The Fourth Quadrant, 78 FORDHAM L. REV.
2767, 2774 & n.10 (2010).
71 See, e.g., Hoofnagle et al., supra note 69, at 273.
72 See Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 16,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html; Kashmir
Hill, How Target Figured out a Teen Girl Was Pregnant Before Her Father Did, FORBES (Feb. 16,
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Times Magazine, these predictions must be used carefully, or customers get
creeped out:
“If we send someone a catalog and say, ‘Congratulations on your first
child!’ and they’ve never told us they’re pregnant, that’s going to make some
people uncomfortable,” Pole told me.  “We are very conservative about com-
pliance with all privacy laws.  But even if you’re following the law, you can do
things where people get queasy.”73
Likewise, even if a consumer might know about one aspect of an information
flow, she often cannot or will not know everything the outsider does with
information.  An informed consumer who knows that a website tracks her
activities may not know, for instance, everything the website does with the
information, or to whom it sells that information.74
Indeed, in some circumstances, observers rely on information subjects
having general, but not specific, knowledge of tracking.  Automated speeding
and red-light cameras are intended (in part) to discourage unsafe traffic
behavior, so drivers must know there is a chance they will be observed speed-
ing or running a red light.  Sometimes police make these cameras obvious, so
they will have an effect in a particularly sensitive or dangerous spot.  But
sometimes they simply announce that cameras will be installed, or will be in
force on specific dates, to induce a general effect.  If drivers knew precisely
where cameras were stationed, they could confine their safer driving to those
areas; only if drivers lack that knowledge can the cameras have their full
desired effect.
In some of these circumstances, it is debatable whether the information
subject or the outsider is the true decisionmaker.  Many consumers, for
instance, know that credit bureaus compile information about financial
transactions and use it to prepare and sell credit reports.  Arguably, they
could prevent these information flows by opting out of entire categories of
financial transactions.  Yet because the costs of opting out would be so great
compared to the benefits of doing so, arguably consumers are compelled to
submit to the credit-reporting system.  Regardless, on the margin the relevant
decisionmaker seems likely to be the outsider: a financial company or credit
bureau can increase the amount of tracking it does—by adding new vari-
ables, collecting data from new sources, or integrating additional databases
2012, 11:02 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/02/16/how-target-fig-
ured-out-a-teen-girl-was-pregnant-before-her-father-did/.
73 Duhigg, supra note 72.
74 This problem is compounded by the common practice of companies writing privacy
policies that reserve broad and vague rights to use data. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N,
WHAT’S THE DEAL? AN FTC STUDY ON MOBILE SHOPPING APPS 1 (2014), http://www.ftc.gov/
system/files/documents/reports/whats-deal-federal-trade-commission-study-mobile-shop-
ping-apps-august-2014/140801mobileshoppingapps.pdf (“[A]lthough nearly all of the
apps made strong security promises and linked to privacy policies, most privacy policies
used vague language that reserved broad rights to collect, use, and share consumer data,
making it difficult for readers to understand how the apps actually used consumer data or
to compare the apps’ data practices.”).
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into its data set—without significantly changing marginal consumer
behavior.
The essential role outsiders play in all of these kinds of information flows
follows from the basic nature of these information flows.  Collecting, using,
and disseminating information are all activities that can both be conducted
by, and inure to the benefit of, outsiders, with or without affecting the infor-
mation subject.  Collecting information about a person, for instance, is some-
thing that outsiders can often do unilaterally; an information subject, on the
other hand, would rarely need to collect information about him or herself,
since he or she likely possesses near-complete information.  Information use,
likewise, frequently requires processing or aggregating information from
readily available public sources, or using certain information to infer other
facts about people, none of which an information subject is likely to need to
do.  And anyone can disseminate information once he or she possesses it,
regardless of the subject’s knowledge or consent; the trick is to acquire the
knowledge in the first instance.
To distinguish outsider-initiated information flows from those initiated
by the information subject, I call those in the former “invasions.”  Invasions
are characterized by the outsider’s intent to collect, use, or disseminate infor-
mation about a subject.75  That does not mean all such invasions are unwel-
come or unwanted by the information subject; many types of information
collection, use, and dissemination benefit, or at least do not harm, informa-
tion subjects.  For instance, credit reporting presumably benefits consumers
with good credit histories; such a consumer will probably welcome the credit
bureau’s information collection and use.76  But because credit bureaus and
other outsiders that initiate invasions make unilateral decisions to collect,
use, and disseminate information, that information becomes more broadly
available to people other than the information subjects.  Due to no action of
his or her own, information about the information subject is less private—is
more available to others—than it otherwise would have been.
Certainly not every information flow is a unilateral invasion; information
subjects do decide to make information about themselves available for others
to collect, use, and disseminate.  But unilateral invasions are of critical impor-
tance in privacy law and theory, for two reasons.  First, unilateral invasions
are far more likely than other information flows to create privacy problems.
Even if a significant number of information flows are initiated by information
subjects, such cases are likely to be less significant for privacy law than those
initiated by outsiders, because information subjects presumably consent to
information flows they themselves initiate; otherwise they would not have
75 Dictionary definitions of “invade” include “[t]o infringe, or encroach on,” Invade,
WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1304 (2d ed. 1941), and “encroach or intrude
on: ‘he felt his privacy was being invaded’.” Invade, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed.
1989), http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/invade (last
visited Jan. 29, 2016).
76 This may be especially true for individuals who might otherwise suffer from discrim-
ination. See STRAHILEVITZ, supra note 48, at 81.
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made the decision that the information flow proceed.  And second, unilat-
eral invasions help shed light on some of the most interesting and important
dilemmas in modern privacy law.  Behavioral advertising, location tracking,
data mining, and other modern commercial tools depend on unilateral inva-
sions, since outside trackers must be able to unilaterally collect, use, and dis-
seminate data about others.  Likewise, many of the most controversial
modern law-enforcement and national-security measures depend on the uni-
lateral collection, use, and dissemination of information about individuals,
including the GPS tracking at issue in Jones, the thermal imaging at issue in
Kyllo v. United States,77 the NSA’s warrantless wiretapping program, and use
of drone aircraft in both domestic law enforcement and overseas military
operations.
B. Rational-Choice and Stochastic-Choice Models of Information Flows
An outsider who decides whether a given information flow will occur is
more likely to engage in that information flow when its benefits outweigh its
costs.  And though this statement may seem obvious, it provides a surprisingly
useful tool for considering privacy in a changing society.  This subsection
discusses two models of the decision to engage in an individual information
flow based on this idea.
The most basic model of a decision to engage in an information flow is a
rational-choice model, which proposes that the decisionmaker will engage in
the information flow if and only if its private benefits exceed its private costs.
Consider a relatively simple example: the use of license plates by police
officers.  License plates can provide various kinds of information about a
driver.  The plates alone can provide some basic information, such as
whether the driver is local or from out of state, or, when the plates are per-
sonalized, a sense of the driver’s personality.  More information, such as the
driver’s name and age, can be obtained by looking up the license-plate num-
ber in a database.  And the sheer act of spotting the license plate at a particu-
lar place and time can reveal that the driver was nearby at that time.
Collecting and using license-plate information, though, has usually been rela-
tively costly for law enforcement: it took time to observe and do something
with a car’s license-plate number, like looking up information about the car
or driver in a database.  So license plates have historically been used as a law-
enforcement tool when needed in two kinds of cases: when a license-plate
number has been linked to a particular crime or suspect, and when a police
officer observes a traffic violation.
In each of these cases, the cost-benefit analysis could come out in favor
of the information flow.  When a license-plate number has been linked to a
particular crime, the number of information flows required to track down
the suspect might be large, but the cost of each information flow is very
small.  For instance, if a witness sees the license plate on a bank robber’s
getaway car, police can be on the lookout for that license plate at little cost
77 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
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for each observation.  Say the cost is $1 for each time an officer looks at a car
to see if it matches the description of the suspect’s car, in officer time, oppor-
tunity costs from not pursuing other crimes, and so forth.  If the benefit of
capturing a specific suspect is high—say, $50,000 for a bank robber—then
the information flow is worthwhile even if each observation has only a 0.01%
chance of finding the right car.78  A police department is thus likely to
devote its resources to those information flows.79
When an officer sees a specific traffic violation and can stop the driver
without searching for a specific license plate, the cost of the individual infor-
mation flow is somewhat higher, since it takes more time to pull over a driver,
check a database for notes about the car and driver, and process a traffic stop
than to glance at a license plate.  Say this cost is $20 in officer time and
database costs.  But because the cost is incurred only once, with no specula-
tion or trial and error, it can be outweighed by even a relatively small benefit.
If the benefit of stopping a driver who ran a red light is $100 (in the likely
fine paid by the driver and in safety and deterrent effects from enforcing
traffic laws), the benefit outweighs the $20 cost, and the information flow is
cost-efficient.  But if the cost were less certain—if, for instance, a witness
wrote down the license-plate number for a car that ran a red light and
officers needed to check different plates to find the right car—then the
information flows would not be cost effective.80  The bottom line, then, is
that a particular category of information flows—reviewing license plates to
catch criminals—would occur only in the limited circumstances when it was
especially valuable.
This account of the cost-benefit analysis of using license plates made
sense when license-plate numbers could only be read by humans.  In the last
decade, however, automatic license-plate recognition technology has turned
this analysis on its head and greatly expanded the universe of cost-efficient
information flows.81  Recognition devices take photographs of cars’ license
plates and use optical character recognition to determine and record the
license-plate number.  Because they can operate automatically, either from a
stationary position or while attached to a police car, they reduce or eliminate
the marginal cost of looking for specific license-plate numbers.  So while
nothing changes in the example of an officer witnessing a traffic violation,
things are different when a plate number of interest has been identified.
Instead of $1 per observation, the cost of checking a plate number to see if it
matches might be 1¢ or even 0.01¢.  Before it only made sense to check
license-plate numbers when a specific car was being sought in connection
78 The expected value of each observation is $50,000 × 0.01% = $5, well above the $1
cost.
79 This assumes a police department is the relevant decisionmaker, since the depart-
ment sets its officers’ agendas, but the same point applies if you assume officers are inde-
pendent actors, obtaining benefits in the form of recognition, prestige, or promotion.
80 If we assume the same 0.01% chance of spotting the right license plate, then the
expected value of each observation is $100 × 0.01% = 1¢, well below the $1 cost.
81 See, e.g., Gonzalez, supra note 36.
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with a major crime, as when a getaway car has been identified or a kidnapper
is on the run.82  Suddenly, it might be cost-efficient to search for a car even
when the crime is as minor as a traffic violation,83 or to automatically check
every license plate against a list of cars involved in crimes.84  License plates
became, in effect, less private without becoming more sensitive or personal:
people were more likely to observe and use license-plate information when it
became less costly to do so.
Besides making these two scenarios more affordable, recognition devices
make other uses of license plates possible for the first time.  For instance,
several European cities use recognition technology to enforce congestion
taxes, which charge vehicles in busy city centers during peak hours.85  Such a
system can operate more cheaply, with better enforcement, than alternatives
like tolling or paid permits.  And both federal and local law-enforcement offi-
cials have begun to make purely speculative use of recognition technology,
observing plate numbers and recording their locations in databases.86  Such
a database can show that a particular car was seen in a particular place at a
particular time, information that might later prove valuable in a criminal
investigation.  If the same car happened to be spotted near each of a string of
similar muggings, for instance, it might indicate that someone connected
with that car was involved in the crimes.  Because the marginal cost of each
82 For instance, the AMBER Alert system publicizes information about in-progress kid-
napping cases, in the hopes that members of the community will spot and report informa-
tion about these cases.  AMBER Alerts often include information about the suspect’s car,
including its license-plate number. See, e.g., Stephen Rushin, The Judicial Response to Mass
Police Surveillance, 2011 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 281, 285; Sabrina A. Lochner, Note,
Saving Face: Regulating Law Enforcement’s Use of Mobile Facial Recognition Technology & Iris
Scans, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 201, 225 (2013).
83 Under our previous assumptions, that a scan has a 0.01% probability of spotting the
right license plate, and that the value of spotting the right plate in the case of a traffic
violation is $100, the expected value of each scan is $100 × 0.01% = 1¢, the same as the cost
of each scan.
84 Cf. People v. Arden, No. B226290, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2737 (Cal. Ct.
App. Apr. 14, 2011) (affirming conviction, without significant analysis, for occupying a
stolen vehicle when the vehicle was identified as stolen by an automatic license-plate
reader).
85 London, Stockholm, and Gothenburg all have these sorts of congestion-pricing sys-
tems.  Former New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg proposed a similar system for Manhat-
tan, but was unsuccessful in implementing it. See Nicholas Confessore, $8 Traffic Fee for
Manhattan Gets Nowhere, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/08/
nyregion/08congest.html.
86 See, e.g., Devlin Barrett, U.S. Spies on Millions of Drivers, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 26, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-spies-on-millions-of-cars-1422314779; Gonzalez, supra
note 36; Christine Vendel, KC Police Hold a Treasure Trove of License Plate Data, KANSAS CITY
STAR (Mo.) (June 30, 2012), http://www.kansascity.com/news/local/article306332/KC-
police-hold-a-treasure-trove-of-license-plate-data.html.  The American Civil Liberties Union
has launched a project to file public-records requests with local police agencies and deter-
mine how different agencies have used license-plate tracking. See Automatic License Plate
Readers, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-technology/location-tracking/auto-
matic-license-plate-readers (last visited Jan. 29, 2016).
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automated scan is so low, it can be worthwhile to record and save informa-
tion even on the bare possibility that it will eventually prove useful.87
This rational-choice analysis helps explain decisionmaking in a narrow
set of cases, since a rational, risk-neutral decisionmaker with perfect informa-
tion will engage in the information flow if and only if the private benefit
outweighs the private cost.  Such a model, though, has its limits: it cannot
account for risk-averse decisionmakers, uncertainty in the probability of a
favorable outcome, or bounded rationality in decisionmakers.  Nor does it
provide an account of aggregate behavior across a category of information
flows.
To overcome these limitations, economists have developed various
stochastic-choice models of decisionmaking given imperfect information.88
These models assume that decisionmakers do not make a deterministic
binary choice to act or not, depending solely on whether the benefits of an
action exceed its costs.  Rather, they posit that in addition to the action’s
costs and benefits, a decision is based on other factors that introduce a
degree of randomness to the choice.89  The result is a model that depends
on the decisionmaker’s cost-benefit analysis, but also accounts for differences
due to uncertainty, bounded rationality, and considerations that do not show
up in an information flow’s costs or benefits.  So when the benefits and costs
are identical, the information flow will occur with probability 50%.90  When
the benefits are slightly greater than the costs, then the probability of the
information flow is greater than 50%, but not by much, and the opposite is
true when the costs slightly outweigh the benefits.  As the benefits increase
87 One maker of recognition systems brags that its products can capture and process
up to 8,000 license-plate numbers per hour, at essentially zero marginal cost. See T3 Auto-
matic License Plate Recognition System (ALPR), T3 MOTION, http://t3motion.com/lpr_page
.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2016).
88 See, e.g., CHARLES F. HOFACKER, MATHEMATICAL MARKETING, ch. 15 (2007), http://
www.openaccesstexts.org/pdf/Quant_Chapter_15_stochastic.pdf; Thierry Magnac, Logit
Models of Individual Choice, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (Steven N.
Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008); Daniel McFadden, Conditional Logit Anal-
ysis of Qualitative Choice Behavior, in FRONTIERS IN ECONOMETRICS 105 (Paul Zarembka ed.,
1974); Pavlo R. Blavatskyy & Ganna Pogrebna, Models of Stochastic Choice and Decision Theo-
ries: Why Both Are Important for Analyzing Decisions, 25 J. APPLIED ECONOMETRICS 963 (2010);
Drew Fudenberg & Tomasz Strzalecki, Recursive Stochastic Choice (Dec. 18, 2012) (unpub-
lished manuscript), http://scholar.harvard.edu/?fudenberg/files/recursive_stochastic_
choice.pdf.
89 Logit models are the most frequently used type of model in estimating a probability
distribution of outcomes by a decisionmaker making a binary decision, such as whether or
not to engage in an information flow.  That model postulates that the probability distribu-
tion of a binary random variable Yi, which takes the values 0 and 1, given the covariate Xi, is
given by Pr(Yi = 1 ⏐ Xi) = exp(Xi b) / (1 + exp(Xi b)), where b is a parameter that deter-
mines the width of the curve. E.g., Magnac, supra note 88.  If we take Yi to be the decision
to engage or not in the information flow, with 1 corresponding to a decision to engage in
the information flow, then Xi can be taken to represent a function of the relative private
costs and benefits of the information flow, such as Xi = (Benefiti – Costi) / Costi.
90 When Benefiti = Costi, Xi = 0 and Pr(Yi = 1) = exp(0) / (1 + exp(0)) = 1/2.
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relative to the costs, the probability that the information flow will occur
approaches 100%, while as the costs increase relative to the benefits, the
probability approaches 0%.
This stochastic-choice approach is a plausible description of the real
world.  Consider a shopping mall trying to decide whether to install a loca-
tion-tracking system like the FootPath system discussed in the Introduction.
If the cost of the system is $3 million and the best estimate of the present
value of the system’s benefits is $2.7 million, then the classical rational-choice
model tells us that the mall will not install the system.  Yet it is not hard to tell
a story in which the mall decides nevertheless to go forward with the system.
Maybe the mall operator is a risk-taker and values the upside potential more
than the downside risks.  Maybe the benefits are uncertain enough that the
mall operator wants to run an experiment to see if they prove worthwhile.91
Maybe the mall operator has simply miscalculated the costs and benefits.
Regardless of the reason, it is plausible to think that rather than being 0%,
the probability that the decisionmaker will decide to install the system might
be closer to 20% or 30%.  Yet if the best guess of the benefits was closer to
$300,000 than $2.7 million, that probability might be far closer to 0%, since
the cost would dominate the decisionmaking process.92
C. Aggregated Information Flows
Although both the rational-choice and stochastic-choice models offer
plausible accounts in different circumstances of the decision to engage or
not in an information flow, they are not enough to predict how often an
information subject will be subject to invasions of privacy.  To do so, we need
to consider both the likelihood that a particular information flow will occur
and how often such information flows have an opportunity to occur.  Even an
unlikely privacy loss can be a big problem if there are many opportunities for
it to occur.93
This calculation ends up comporting with a wide variety of real-world
intuitions about privacy.  Take the example of a family building a home.  The
family might care about how much privacy the home will give them, but that
is likely to be just one of numerous competing values, such as construction
91 Indeed, this is what happened in real life: Forest City, a large real-estate developer
with numerous malls, installed the system in two of its properties as a test.  See Censky,
supra note 1.
92 Using the numbers in this example and the model given above, when the expected
cost is $3 million and the expected benefit is $2.7 million, the covariate Xi, representing
the relative costs and benefits of the project, is equal to –0.11.  Setting the parameter b =
10, we get a probability of the information flow occurring of Pr(Yi = 1) ≈ 24.8%.  If the
expected benefit is $300,000, however, then Xi = –9.0, and Pr(Yi = 1) ≈ 0.00%.
93 To put it in the math of footnote 89, we can calculate the expected number of
invasions of privacy over a time period by summing the individual probabilities of an inva-
sion: E(Y ⏐ Xi) = Si (exp(Xi b) / (1 + exp(Xi b))).  The value of this summation will
increase with more terms in the summation, i.e., more opportunities for an invasion to
occur.
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and maintenance costs, energy efficiency, aesthetics of the home, views from
the home, and so forth.  A key design choice the family will face will be how
many windows, and of what size, to include in the home.  Larger windows
make it easier for passers-by to observe the family’s activities.94  All else being
equal, the family will have more privacy if they reduce the number and size of
the home’s windows, or increase the cost of invading privacy by using coun-
termeasures like curtains.  But all else is not equal; many more potential
invaders will pass by if the home is in Manhattan than if it is in the middle of
the woods.  The family might have far more privacy in the woods, even in a
home built like Johnson’s Glass House or van der Rohe’s Farnsworth House,
than it would in an urban home with tiny windows.
This is a purely descriptive model, focusing on what information is col-
lected, used, and disseminated by others, rather than on what the content of
that information is.  Though it ignores the sensitive or secret nature of any
particular information flow, such a descriptive model is nevertheless useful,
both because some areas of the law depend only on whether information is
known to others, not on what that information is, and because it helps pro-
vide a roadmap for government regulation of privacy.  The next Part devel-
ops that account.
III. TOWARD A ROADMAP FOR REGULATING PRIVACY
Ultimately, people who care about privacy should care about how it is
regulated by the government.  Designing effective privacy regulations is a sur-
prisingly difficult problem, because naı¨ve solutions like just maximizing or
minimizing the amount of privacy information subjects enjoy are rarely the
right answer.  Privacy almost always requires tradeoffs.  Give the police too
much authority to peer into private affairs and you sacrifice privacy and lib-
erty; but give too little and you sacrifice security and safety.95  Moreover,
these tradeoffs are dynamic: norms, technologies, and incentives change
quickly, making it hard for law to keep up.96  It is easy, then, for privacy
regulations to have unexpected and unintended consequences.
This part takes the unilateral-invasion account of privacy developed in
Part II and argues that it can help develop effective privacy regulations.  It
first addresses a necessary precondition: that normative privacy preferences
look, at least in many contexts, to outcomes—to how easily information can
be collected, used, and disseminated, or how often such information flows
occur—rather than to absolute rights.  It then uses the unilateral-invasion
account to explain how law can best produce normatively desirable levels of
privacy.  Changes in norms, technologies, and incentives can alter a deci-
sionmaker’s cost-benefit analysis even when the optimal level of privacy has
94 In the language of the model, they reduce the cost of invading privacy, increasing
Xi.
95 Cf. Jeremy Waldron, Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance, 11 J. POL. PHIL. 191
(2003).
96 See Kerr, supra note 13, at 485–87.
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not changed, or has changed in a way that is inconsistent with the deci-
sionmaker’s costs and benefits.  Law, then, can counteract these changes and
restore the optimal level of privacy.  Indeed, legal changes have followed this
pattern in numerous domains.  Finally, this Part addresses the most signifi-
cant critique: that law should seek to give information subjects more control,
or change who makes decisions about which information flows occur, rather
than target unilateral invaders’ incentives.  Although such a strategy is prom-
ising in some contexts, it is likely to be unworkable most of the time, since
the costs it would impose on information subjects would be prohibitive.
A. Outcome-Oriented Privacy
Privacy preferences take many forms; indeed, how to think normatively
about privacy is one of the central debates in the field.  Broadly speaking,
normative views of privacy fall into two camps, which we can think of as beha-
viorist and consequentialist.  The behaviorist camp looks to actors’ actions
rather than the consequences of those actions.  Someone in this camp might
assert, for instance, that individuals have the right to engage in certain
actions due to the nature of those actions—to engage in a specific type of
information flow, for instance, or to prevent that information flow from
occurring.  The First Amendment is a good example: with limited excep-
tions, the press has the right to publish whatever information it desires,
including personal information, without the information subject’s consent
and regardless of the consequences of the publication.97  It can also work the
other way.  Under right-of-publicity laws, for instance, individuals typically
have the ability to block commercial uses of their likenesses.98  Similarly,
under the FTC’s Do Not Call Registry, a phone user can prevent
telemarketers from calling a given phone number.99  These laws may or may
not be designed with privacy in mind, but the key point is that an action can
have privacy consequences—increasing or reducing an individual’s privacy—
even though the laws governing that action may be viewed as normatively
desirable or undesirable without considering those consequences.
The consequentialist camp, in contrast, looks to the outcome of a given
action and its effects on privacy rather than to the action itself.  This camp
focuses on how much privacy people have or what information is public or
private.  One good example is the context-sensitive ways in which police
departments often release crime information.  The Reno Police Depart-
97 See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989) (holding that it violates the
First Amendment to subject a newspaper to damages for publishing truthful, legally
acquired information).
98 E.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), reh’g denied,
989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a TV ad with a robot designed to look like
Vanna White, flipping letters on a replica of the Wheel of Fortune game board, infringed
White’s exclusive right of publicity in her likeness).
99 See Do-Not-Call Implementation Act of 2003, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6151–55 (2012); National
Do Not Call Registry, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.donotcall.gov/ (last visited Jan. 29,
2016).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-3\NDL305.txt unknown Seq: 31 30-MAR-16 12:48
2016] unilateral  invasions  of  privacy 1105
ment’s media guide, for instance, explains the different kinds of information
about the identities of criminal suspects and victims that may or may not be
released.  Arrestees’ names are usually released, while victims’ names are gen-
erally not released unless they are deceased and the next of kin has been
notified.100  In cases involving sexual offenses or crimes involving children,
however, even the names of arrestees, and other information about the
crimes, may not be released if it would tend to identify the victims.101
Whether the Department engages in an action—releasing information about
a crime—depends, then, on the privacy consequences of the information
flow rather than anything about the action itself.
Consequentialist views of privacy are especially common in the criminal-
procedure context, in which the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness frame-
work invites a balancing of interests on each side.  Indeed, Orin Kerr has
argued that the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is best
understood as a series of equilibrium adjustments, dynamic tweaks to the
rules in response to exogenous changes.  Under this theory, rule changes can
be desirable because they give the government an approximately consistent
level of access to investigatory information; consistency in the rules is less
important than consistency in the privacy (or investigatory) consequences of
those rules.102  Under consequentialist views of privacy, then, the normative
desirability of a law is a function of its privacy consequences, of the types and
quantities of privacy it produces.
In many areas of the law, if privacy is a salient normative consideration—
if we care about privacy as a relevant value—then we should judge the desira-
bility of a law on consequentialist grounds rather than behaviorist, for two
major reasons.  First, many privacy harms arise out of downstream conse-
quences of actions, rather than out of the actions themselves; a view of pri-
vacy that looks only to actions misses these harms.  When a celebrity is
harassed by a paparazzo seeking to take an unflattering photograph, for
example, the mere act of taking the photo presumably causes its subject to
feel some privacy loss: it might make him or her feel insecure and unsafe, as
if there was no safe place to let his or her guard down.103  But much of the
harm stems from later publication of the photo, which can subject the target
to ridicule, loss of income, and other consequential harms.104  These conse-
quential harms are especially pronounced in the kinds of privacy losses suf-
fered by ordinary individuals.  When a credit card processor suffers a data
breach, for instance, the harms consist of things like fraudulent charges,
100 RENO POLICE DEP’T, MEDIA GUIDE 4–5 (2012), http://www.reno.gov/home/show
document?id=42148.
101 Id. at 5.
102 See Kerr, supra note 13, at 526–29; see also Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Cam-
era Surveillance of Public Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213 (2002).
103 Ryan Calo classifies these harms, which arise out of the feeling of unwanted observa-
tion, as subjective privacy harms. See M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND.
L.J. 1131, 1142–55 (2011).
104 See id. at 1147–55 (discussing objective privacy harms).
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costs from having to update payment information for recurring charges, and
maybe identity theft.105  An analysis of processors’ data-security measures
that failed to consider those consequences is unlikely to come to the right
balance of security and cost.  Considering consequential privacy harms, then,
is necessary to avoid missing a large part of the privacy story in a given field.
The second reason to prefer consequentialist views of privacy is that they
better account for the factors that influence privacy outcomes.  The effect of
an action on privacy is not determined solely by the action; other, indepen-
dent factors also play a role.  The privacy effect of a paparazzi photo, for
instance, depends not only on what the photo shows, but on how widely it
spreads—and that might depend on the photographer’s relationship with
tabloid editors, the other things that happened that week and would com-
pete for attention, and even whether Twitter or The Daily Show exist to help
the photo go viral.  And these factors are not stable; they change as norms,
technology, and incentives change.  A policy designed according to a beha-
viorist view of privacy, then, would have unpredictable effects, since changes
to the broader context of an action would lead to changes in its privacy con-
sequences.  For instance, a policy providing that police have the right to track
individuals’ movements through space has strikingly different privacy conse-
quences before and after GPS tracking devices become available.
Privacy is obviously not the only important value; there are numerous
other reasons to support or oppose any given public policy.106  I am not argu-
ing that all public-policy decisions should be based on privacy consequences.
Rather, the point is that when privacy matters, the best way to account for
privacy is to analyze the consequences of a policy rather than the actions that
lead to those consequences.  Thinking of privacy in this way, as a set of conse-
quences of information flows rather than a set of rights enjoyed by informa-
tion subjects, makes it easier to design policies that produce desirable privacy
consequences.
B. Regulating the Costs and Benefits of Information Flows
So what is the role of law in regulating privacy?  As discussed in Part II,
the amount of privacy enjoyed by an information subject is a function of what
information flows occur, which in turn are, in many cases, unilaterally deter-
mined by outsiders.  So it is those outsiders’ incentives that need to be con-
sidered and, in many cases, adjusted.  The trick is knowing when and how to
105 Data breaches have become increasingly common, as more and more information
moves online and as criminals use security flaws to gain access to valuable information. See
generally Kimberly Kiefer Peretti, Data Breaches: What the Underground World of “Carding”
Reveals, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 375 (2009); Paul M. Schwartz &
Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 105 MICH. L. REV. 913 (2007); Caro-
line C. Cease, Note, Giving Out Your Number: A Look at the Current State of Data Breach Litiga-
tion, 66 ALA. L. REV. 395 (2014).
106 Nor is privacy independent of these other values; there are often nonobvious inter-
dependencies between privacy and other values. See, e.g., Ryan Calo, Privacy and Markets: A
Love Story, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 649 (2015).
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adjust those incentives, which requires a four-step process: (1) Identify a rele-
vant normative privacy framework that applies in a given circumstance or set
of circumstances and the information flows that should occur under that
framework.  (2) Identify the applicable decisionmakers who determine
whether those information flows occur and the private costs and benefits they
enjoy due to those information flows.  (3) Compare the information flows
that should occur according to the decisionmaker’s cost-benefit analysis to
those that should occur according to the relevant normative framework,
identifying any mismatch between the decisionmaker’s incentives and the
normative ideal.  (4) Use law to change the decisionmaker’s cost-benefit anal-
ysis so it matches the relevant normative framework.
The first step, identifying a normative privacy framework, is where much
of the hard work is done.  The full range of possible frameworks is beyond
the scope of this Article; law can play the same role to adjust incentives to
match essentially any consequentialist privacy framework.  Normative
frameworks will vary greatly depending on the context, the participants’ iden-
tities, the privacy interests at stake, and countless other factors.  But we can
imagine some frameworks that might obtain consensus among policymakers
or other stakeholders.  In the criminal-procedure context, for instance, we
might think that in order to further society’s interest in solving serious
crimes, police investigating those crimes should be able to track suspects’
movements in public.  When investigating less-serious crimes, however, we
might think that individuals’ privacy interests outweigh society’s interest in
enforcing the law.  Or, in the medical context, we might think that patients
should be protected from embarrassment when receiving essential treat-
ments, to avoid discouraging patients from seeking care, but that the privacy
interests are less critical when patients get cosmetic work done.  These might
not be the best normative frameworks, but the point is that in each case, we
want some information flows to occur more often and others to occur less
often.
Once we have identified a normative privacy framework, we can move to
the second step, identifying the applicable decisionmakers and their costs
and benefits.  In many cases, this will be straightforward.  Police, for instance,
are often the sole decisionmakers deciding whether to track a suspect’s move-
ments, though in some cases, technological barriers may require cooperation
from someone else, like a telephone company or other business.107  Some-
times the inquiry will be more complicated; for instance, patients, doctors,
hospitals, and insurance companies influence what medical information is
distributed to the public, but so do tabloid newspapers and other journalists
107 In many cases, courts or other legal officials will also be applicable decisionmakers,
as when an officer is required to obtain a warrant before executing a search.  We can
disregard for now, however, these effects of legal rules, since the point of the exercise is to
figure out how law can adjust the costs and benefits the applicable decisionmakers would
face in the absence of legal rules.
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who decide what information is worth publishing.108  Regardless, under-
standing who the relevant decisionmakers are is important, since otherwise,
policies that are intended to affect information flows may miss the mark.
The third step requires comparing the information flows that should
occur in view of the relevant decisionmaker’s cost-benefit analysis to those
that should occur according to the normative framework identified in step
one.  This tells us whether any intervention is needed in the first place; if
existing incentives are already producing the correct mix of information
flows, then there is no problem to be solved.  Only when the relevant deci-
sionmaker’s incentives produce the “wrong” information flows does law have
any corrective role to play.
This point may seem uncontroversial, but it is not how policymakers and
scholars usually think about privacy law.  Under the unilateral-invasions the-
ory, how much privacy individuals should enjoy in a given class of informa-
tion—whether due to the sensitive nature of the information, the individuals’
status, or any other factor—may be completely unrelated to how much the
law should protect that privacy interest.  And we see that in the real world:
some things that can be highly sensitive—like information about individuals’
sexual interests and activities—are legally unprotected.  Existing incentives
are strong enough to adequately protect this category of information, both
because there are strong norms against trading this information, and because
the relevant decisionmakers are usually limited to an individual and his or
her sexual partners, who can decline to release information they want to
keep private.  Law would have little role to play.  In other areas, sensitive
information is legally protected precisely because there is a need; the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, for instance, is needed to pro-
tect the privacy of health information because there are outsiders—health
professionals—with access to sensitive information and incentives to use it.109
Conversely, there are areas where there is no legitimate privacy interest—like
disclosure of financial conflicts of interest by lawyers, doctors, and other fidu-
ciaries—where law plays a privacy-reducing role.  In these cases, without a
legal rule, information would be under-disclosed; information about conflicts
108 For instance, after Mark Chanko’s death was broadcast on the ABC documentary
series NY Med, his family sued ABC, NewYork-Presbyterian Hospital, and the treating physi-
cian, Dr. Sebastian Schubl.  Producers had blurred the video of Mr. Chanko, but his voice
was audible and friends and family were able to identify him. See Charles Ornstein, Dying
in the E.R., and on TV Without His Family’s Consent, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2015), http://www
.nytimes.com/2015/01/04/nyregion/dying-in-the-er-and-on-tv-without-his-familys-consent
.html.  The lawsuit was dismissed, on the grounds that the producers’ conduct “was not so
extreme and outrageous as to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress,” and that no “personal information” was disclosed when the producers had blurred
Mr. Chanko’s face. See Chanko v. Am. Broad. Cos. Inc., 997 N.Y.S.2d 44 (N.Y. App. Div.
2014).
109 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
110 Stat. 1936, 2033–34 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-2, 1320d-2, 1320d-4 (2012)); see
also 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.500–.534 (2014) (codifying the privacy regulations).
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of interest would be too private under existing norms, technologies, and
incentives.
After identifying any mismatch between the information flows that
should occur and those that are expected to occur, the fourth and final step
is to design laws to bring the two into alignment.  Since it is the relevant
decisionmaker’s cost-benefit analysis that determines which information
flows occur, this is done by adjusting those costs and benefits.  This can mean
increasing or decreasing the costs of an information flow, or increasing or
decreasing its benefits; all four possibilities must be considered.
There are innumerable ways to adjust the costs, to the relevant deci-
sionmakers, of information flows.  If the government wants to increase the
cost of a class of information flows, for example, it can impose a tax or fee on
it, as the British government did to newspapers under the Stamp Act110 and
does to television owners under the Television Licensing Regulations,111 or
as federal courts do when they charge fees for electronic access to court
records,112 or as copyright law does when it imposes statutory royalties for
distributing cover songs.113  Or law can ban a category of information flows
outright (which then imposes legal costs for engaging in the information
flow), as is done with child pornography,114 for example, or with the use of
certain medical information for marketing purposes.115  Law can also impose
indirect costs.  When a business wishes to make use of customer information,
for example, the law can impose disclosure or opt-in requirements, which
impose compliance costs (from having to inform customers of the use) or
reputational costs (from privacy-sensitive customers who disapprove of the
use).  Reducing the costs of information flows can take the opposite form, as
when government provides subsidies, tax benefits, or prizes, or acts as a pur-
chaser in the marketplace.116  It can also provide infrastructure that supports
information flows, as when the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,
a piece of the Defense Department, created the computer networks that
became the Internet.117  And it can provide legal immunities that reduce the
risk of engaging in information flows, as in Section 230 of the Communica-
110 See RANDALL P. BEZANSON, TAXES ON KNOWLEDGE IN AMERICA 13 (1994).
111 See Communications Act, 2003, ch. 21, §§ 231–40 (Eng., N. Ir.).
112 See Electronic Public Access Fee Schedule, U.S. COURTS (Aug. 20, 2014), http://www
.uscourts.gov/services-forms/fees/electronic-public-access-fee-schedule.
113 See 17 U.S.C. § 115(c) (2012).
114 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a), (b)(1) (2012).
115 See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.501, 164.508(a)(3) (2014).
116 Many of these activities are directed at generating new information, rather than at
encouraging the collection, use, and disclosure of existing information. See, e.g., Chal-
lenges, CHALLENGE.GOV, https://www.challenge.gov/list/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2016) (com-
piling government prizes for the development of new innovations).  Still, the two
mechanisms are the same.  For instance, the tax exemption for religious institutions has
the effect of subsidizing the dissemination of religious information—a subsidy for a spe-
cific category of information flows. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).
117 See, e.g., JANET ABBATE, INVENTING THE INTERNET 37, 185 (2000); KATIE HAFNER &
MATTHEW LYON, WHERE WIZARDS STAY UP LATE: THE ORIGINS OF THE INTERNET 10 (1996).
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tions Decency Act, which immunizes providers of online services from liabil-
ity for content posted by users of those services.118  These are just some of the
myriad tools the law has to adjust the costs of information flows; many others
could be imagined as well.
Though it is harder than adjusting costs, there are also ways to adjust the
benefits of a class of information flows.  One way to do that is by adjusting the
available alternatives to the information flows.  This is especially true for busi-
ness benefits of information flows, since many are available only because busi-
nesses have limited alternatives to achieve the same benefits.  Businesses rely
on information to focus their marketing efforts on the most likely customers,
for example, but the benefits of doing so would be lowered if there were
other effective marketing channels that did not rely on obtaining and using
personal information.  There is not always a clear line between adjusting
costs and adjusting benefits; building the Internet, for example, created a
communications infrastructure that reduced the cost of many information
flows, but it also created network effects that increased their benefits.  But
regardless, the point is that costs and benefits are adjustable in numerous
ways.
It is important to note that this is a dynamic process.  As technologies,
norms, and incentives change, the expected information flows will change
with them.  Unless normative privacy frameworks change in corresponding
ways—and there is no good reason to think they will—law has to adjust to
keep up.  So, as new technologies made it easier and cheaper for police to
monitor a suspect’s movements in public, as happened in United States v.
Jones,119 more police took advantage of those new technologies to extend
surveillance to more and more suspects.  If the previous level of surveillance,
which extended only to suspects in serious crimes, was the normatively ideal
level, then the law needed to adjust to make it harder for police to use the
new surveillance technologies.  This is not the only possibility; maybe the cor-
rect normative view would permit broad surveillance, which was just impossi-
ble before due to technological limitations, or maybe the normative ideal
shifted, say, after the September 11 attacks.  But if the previous behavior was
consistent with our normative privacy framework, and that framework did
not change, then law needed to change to keep up with the new technolo-
gies—as, indeed, it did in Jones.
Many of these legal rules would have effects that go beyond those on
individuals’ privacy.  A legal rule that results in the ideal set of information
flows from a privacy perspective might have other effects that make it a bad
idea, or just make it difficult or impossible to implement.  But since there are
so many ways to adjust the costs and benefits of information flows, it is likely
that in most contexts there will be at least one solution that both improves
privacy outcomes and has positive or neutral non-privacy effects.  The chal-
118 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2012).
119 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); see also supra text accompanying notes 11–12.
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lenge of making policy is finding that balance, but the unilateral-invasion
theory should help policymakers consider all the alternatives.
C. Regulating Unilateral Invaders
There is an important alternative strategy for policymakers looking to
address privacy problems: work to make information flows more transparent
and give information subjects the power to control how information about
them is collected, used, and disseminated.  Many privacy regulations and gov-
ernment recommendations take this approach, and it is a preferred strategy
of most industries that use information about others.120  At first glance, this
strategy might seem better than the strategy of adjusting outsiders’ costs and
benefits, as described in Section III.B, since it tackles directly the problem of
unilateral invasions by returning the decisionmaking power to information
subjects instead of those outsiders.  And when it works, it can have some sig-
nificant advantages over strategies directed to outsiders.  But in the majority
of cases, it is likely to have significant downsides that make it unsuitable as a
solution to most privacy problems.
Working to give information subjects more transparency and control
over how information about them is collected, used, and disseminated has at
least two significant benefits.  First, it respects individual autonomy by giving
individuals power over their own privacy.  A society in which unilateral inva-
sions are the norm could quickly become a society in which individuals have
no expectations of privacy, and thus in which governments and corporations
have greater control over even the most private aspects of people’s lives.
Returning control over how information is used can be a helpful first step
toward seizing control over other aspects of people’s lives from a distributed,
decentralized Big Brother.
120 See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID
CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 35–60 (2012) (recom-
mending that businesses provide users with “simplified consumer choice”); THE WHITE
HOUSE, ADMINISTRATION DISCUSSION DRAFT: CONSUMER PRIVACY BILL OF RIGHTS ACT OF
2015 (2015) (focusing on transparency and consumer control as the cornerstones of a
proposed privacy “bill of rights”); THE WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A
NETWORKED WORLD: A FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION
IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY 11 (2012) (proposing that “[c]onsumers have a right to
exercise control over what personal data companies collect from them and how they use
it”).  The FTC, for instance, is far more likely to take action against a company that violates
its privacy policy than against one that follows a substantively unfair privacy policy. See
generally Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy,
114 COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014).  And in Europe, consent is the most common basis for
data processing under the Data Protection Directive. See Council Directive 95/46/EC, of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of
Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281/31) (adopting the Data Protection Directive); Opinion of the
Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data on 15/
2011 on the Definition of Consent, 01197/11/EN, WP 187, (July 13, 2011), http://ec.europa
.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2011/wp187_en.pdf.
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And second, it better accounts for individuals’ different privacy prefer-
ences.  As Alan Westin showed, individuals have strikingly different feelings
about privacy, with some caring deeply about privacy and others not caring at
all.121  The ideal normative privacy framework in many contexts may require
respecting the privacy of individuals who place high value on privacy, but
disregarding the privacy of those who do not care.  We may want, for
instance, to respect the privacy preferences of individuals who do not want to
be tracked online by advertising companies, to provide an environment con-
ducive to free expression and engagement with the community, while still
using information about those who do not care about privacy so that online
content can be supported economically.  This requires a mechanism for solic-
iting and incorporating individual preferences, which might be easy to do if
users have control over how information is used, and hard to do if regulation
is directed toward outside invaders rather than information subjects.122
There are, nevertheless, reasons to be skeptical of efforts to give infor-
mation subjects more transparency and control, at least as a strategy for solv-
ing privacy problems.  Such strategies have been tried over and over, usually
to little effect.  Recall the complaints about the FootPath system, which
tracked shoppers’ movements through retail stores.123  After Senator Schu-
mer asked the FTC to intervene, he worked with seven major retail analytics
companies to develop a voluntary industry code of conduct, under which
companies agreed to allow consumers to opt out of tracking.124  Yet so many
things have to come true before a consumer opts out that it is almost incon-
ceivable that more than a handful have done so: a consumer has to know that
121 Westin classified individuals into three categories: privacy fundamentalists, privacy
pragmatists, and the privacy unconcerned.  Privacy fundamentalists (who Westin estimated
make up 25% of the population) “see[ ] privacy as an especially high value” and “reject[ ]
the claims of many organizations to need or be entitled to get personal information for
their business or governmental programs.”  Privacy pragmatists (55%) weigh privacy as a
value but are willing to balance it against “the value, both to them and to society, of various
business or government programs calling for personal information.”  And the privacy
unconcerned (20%) not only do not worry about their own privacy, but don’t see “what the
‘privacy fuss’ is all about” and don’t understand why others would care.  Alan F. Westin,
“Whatever Works”: The American Public’s Attitudes Toward Regulation and Self-Regulation on Con-
sumer Privacy Issues, in U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, PRIVACY AND SELF-REGULATION IN THE
INFORMATION AGE (1997), http://www.ntia.doc.gov/page/chapter-1-theory-markets-and-
privacy#1F; see also PONNURANGAM KUMARAGURU & LORRIE FAITH CRANOR, PRIVACY INDEXES:
A SURVEY OF WESTIN’S STUDIES (2005), http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~ponguru/CMU-ISRI-05-
138.pdf; see generally ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967).
122 See, e.g., Ariel Porat & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure
with Big Data, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1417, 1433–53 (2014).
123 See supra notes 1–8 and accompanying text.
124 See Carl Franzen, Senator Unveils Plan to Restrict Tracking of Your Location Data in Retail
Stores, Backed by Industry, VERGE (Oct. 22, 2013, 7:19 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2013/
10/22/4867952/NY-schumer-do-not-track-shoppers-retail-stores-self-regulating; see also
FUTURE OF PRIVACY FORUM, MOBILE LOCATION ANALYTICS CODE OF CONDUCT (2013), https:/
/fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/10.22.13-FINAL-MLA-Code.pdf; Mobile Location Analytics Opt
Out, FUTURE OF PRIVACY FORUM (2014), http://smartstoreprivacy.org/.
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retailers use such systems; has to hear about the opt-out system; has to find
the site; and has to enter her phone’s wifi and Bluetooth MAC addresses into
the system.125  Even then, she also has to remember to submit new MAC
addresses any time she gets a new phone.  And other opt-out systems have
likewise had little uptake by consumers: few consumers opt out of receiving
bulk mail; few consumers opt out of companies’ sale of their information to
outsiders for marketing purposes; and few consumers opt out of online track-
ing (whether through channels supported by tracking companies, through
browser tools like the Do Not Track flag, or through plugins like
Ghostery).126
There is a simple reason that opt-out rules do not work, and that other
efforts give information subjects more transparency and control are unlikely
to fare much better.  The burden on individuals, who would have to make
decisions about their own privacy in every privacy-relevant scenario, would be
cost-prohibitive.  Increasing the transparency of information collection, use,
and disclosure, and increasing the control that individuals have, would surely
reduce some of the costs of exercising that control.  But it would not reduce
those costs enough to allow individuals to exercise meaningful privacy
choices for each and every potential privacy loss in their lives—every collec-
tion, use, and disclosure of information about an individual.  Indeed, just
considering the limited context of browsing the Internet, a 2008 study found
that an average user would have to spend 201 hours a year, worth more than
$3,500 per user, to read the privacy policy for each website he or she vis-
ited.127  Adding in other contexts—other forms of communications, shop-
ping in retail stores, transactions with financial institutions, education, health
care, and so forth—would increase this number by much more.  And
Internet users have a relatively robust ability to control the collection of their
125 See Mobile Location Analytics Opt Out, supra note 124.
126 A notable exception is the FTC’s Do Not Call registry, which lets consumers opt out
of receiving unsolicited telemarketing calls.  More than 200 million phone numbers have
been registered in the system. See Lesley Fair, 10 Years of National Do Not Call: Looking Back
and Looking Ahead, FED. TRADE COMM’N: BUS. BLOG (June 27, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://www
.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2013/06/10-years-national-do-not-call-looking-
back-looking-ahead.  Possible explanations for the Do Not Call registry’s atypical success
include its extensive promotion and news coverage and the fact that it eliminates the hassle
of receiving unsolicited calls, not just losses of privacy.  Still, the success of the Do Not Call
registry could provide useful lessons for those designing privacy-enhancing opt-out
schemes.  First, such schemes should be relatively simple.  The Do Not Call registry, for
example, requires only a phone number and an email address.  Second, they should apply
to a broad category of contacts after only one exercise of the right to opt out, rather than
requiring individual actions for different invaders or different avenues of invasion.  The Do
Not Call registry, for example, applies to all commercial telemarketers, without requiring a
user to act separately for each telemarketer.  Third, opt-out schemes should be persistent,
and should not require periodic maintenance.  Phone numbers registered with the Do Not
Call registry, for instance, do not expire, though the original version of the program
required re-registration every five years.
127 Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 I/
S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 543, 565 (2008).
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personal information, through software tools and the ability to opt out of
using certain services, compared to those in some other contexts.  Even then,
the simple cost of taking control can be so great that an information subject
cannot reasonably exercise that control.
There are several reasons to think these costs would be difficult to sur-
mount.  First, the sheer number of potential privacy losses encountered by a
typical person in a typical day is large, given the myriad contexts in which
they arise and the myriad potential privacy invaders one might encounter.
Repeat those options day after day after day, and a typical person would
quickly become overwhelmed by sheer numbers.
Second, even if someone could make that many privacy decisions, many
potential privacy losses are unknown to most people.  It is a rare consumer
who is likely to read the fine-print FootPath disclosure at a mall, or read
about it in the press; the more likely scenario is that someone never even
discovers that his or her cellphone might be tracked.  Likewise, many con-
sumers are unaware that governments and companies use license plate read-
ers to build databases of cars’ movements in public; or that outsiders track
their activities online, let alone that more than a thousand companies do so.
And disclosure mandates have a terrible track record of actually informing
consumers of the things of which they are supposed to inform them.128
Third, even when someone knows about an information flow that can
lead to a privacy loss, many such disclosures leave key terms vague, so that it is
hard to know the privacy consequences of the information flow.  The proto-
typical online privacy policy, for instance, discloses that information about a
user may be used “to provide, maintain, protect[,] and improve” a company’s
services, without saying how the company does so, or what specific uses it
makes.129  Companies also routinely update privacy policies, introducing new
terms without notice, other than by posting the new policy.
And fourth, even when a user knows how information may be collected,
used, or disseminated, the future privacy consequences of that information
flow are often unpredictable.  They may depend on how technologies
develop, how norms and incentives change, and even unpredictable changes
like the sale of one company to another in bankruptcy.130
128 See generally BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 67.
129 The example is from Google’s privacy policy. See Welcome to the Google Privacy Policy,
GOOGLE INC., http://www.google.com/policies/privacy/ (last modified Aug. 19, 2015).
130 See, e.g., Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub.
L. No. 109-8, § 231, 119 Stat. 23, 72–73 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1)
(2012)) (restricting the sale in bankruptcy of personally identifiable information, when
inconsistent with the debtor’s privacy policy); Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC
Announces Settlement With Bankrupt Website, Toysmart.com, Regarding Alleged Privacy
Policy Violations (July 21, 2000), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2000/
07/ftc-announces-settlement-bankrupt-website-toysmartcom-regarding (announcing a set-
tlement after Toysmart.com, which had promised in its privacy policy not to share cus-
tomer information with third parties, had offered its customer database as an asset for sale
in bankruptcy proceedings).
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Some contexts are better suited than others for strategies that aim to
make information flows more transparent and give information subjects the
power to control how information about them is collected, used, and dissemi-
nated.  Such strategies may be more likely to work, for instance, when the
underlying information flows are unusually important to the information
subject, since in those circumstances it will be more worthwhile to spend the
time and make affirmative privacy choices.  But trying to extend those strate-
gies to the myriad contexts in which information about individuals is col-
lected, used, and disseminated is very likely a hopeless task.
CONCLUSION
Too often, accounts of privacy focus on information subjects, rather
than outsiders who collect, use, and disseminate information.  When privacy
problems occur, these accounts suggest ways to give those information sub-
jects more information about, and more control over, how information about
them is collected, used, and disseminated.  Yet, as this Article has demon-
strated, this approach is often doomed to failure: it is usually the outsiders,
not the information subjects, who decide whether an information flow will
occur—and thus whether the information subject will enjoy more privacy or
less.  An information subject may or may not be aware of any given informa-
tion flow, and even when aware, may have no influence over whether it
occurs.  Instead, in many cases the outsider chooses whether to commit a
privacy invasion based on his or her incentives.
This model has important implications for the design of privacy regula-
tions.  Since, in many cases, the outside invader’s incentives determine
whether a privacy invasion will occur, effective privacy regulations are those
that work to alter those incentives.  This can be done by raising or lowering
the private costs or benefits of a privacy invasion, to the outside invader,
depending on how the other private costs and benefits of the invasion com-
pare to the normative ideal.  And since these costs and benefits change as
norms, technologies, and incentives evolve, privacy regulations too must
change to maintain the same level of privacy over time.
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